The general rule is that claimant has the burden of proof as to her right to compensation under the Missouri Workers' Compensation statute. McKiness v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 775 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo.App.1989). An award of compensation rendered without jurisdiction may be impeached at any time in any proceeding. Woodruff v. Tourville Quarry, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Mo.App.1964). Moreover, an employee bears the burden of proving all essential elements of his claim. Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App.1990). Jurisdiction over the claim is one of these elements. See § 287.110(2) RSMo 1986 and Mosley v. Texas Continental Express, 690 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Mo.App.1985); Redden v. Dan Redden Co., 859 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Mo.App. E.D. 1993). The determination of whether Missouri has jurisdiction presents a factual issue, with the claimant having the burden of proof and persuasion on the question. Redden v. Dan Redden Co., 859 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App. 1993).
The Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation only has jurisdiction over cases covered by the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Like all administrative bodies, the division has only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by statute. Mikel v. Pott Industries/St. Louis Ship, 896 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo.,1995). The legislature has granted the division those powers necessary to the proper discharge of its duties under the workers' compensation law. Id, citing § 287.650; Liechty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 162 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Mo.1942). Section 287.110.2 provides that the Workers' Compensation Act:
... shall apply to (1) all injuries received ... in this state, ... and also to (2) all injuries received $\ldots$ outside of this state under contract of employment made in this state, ..., and also to (3) all injuries received ... outside of this state where the employee's employment was principally localized in this state $\qquad$ (numbering added for reference purposes).
The injury occurred in South Dakota, not Missouri, making the first prong inapplicable.
Missouri jurisdiction may exist if the injury was received under a contract of employment made in Missouri. Liberty v. Treasurer for State of Missouri-Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 218 S.W.3d 7, 10 (Mo.App. W.D. 2007). Claimant has failed to establish the injuries she received in South Dakota were under a contract of employment made in Missouri. The only evidence of a "contract of employment" is between John Pizzo Trucking and Claimant, a professional relationship that existed long before either Employer or employee traveled to Missouri to lease with United Van Lines. John Pizzo Trucking paid Claimant's wages, provided her uniform, whether it was that required by United Van Line or any other company, and paid for meals and lodging. Employer carried workers' compensation insurance to cover Claimant, his employee. The parties stipulated Claimant was the employee of Employer. There is certainly no credible evidence to establish an employment contact between United Van Lines, a Missouri based corporation, and Claimant.
Claimant emphasized facts suggesting the agreement between United Van Lines and John Pizzo Trucking was finalized in Missouri. Under Missouri law, a contract is deemed to have been made where the parties perform the last act necessary to complete the contract. Id, citing
Gash v. Black \& Veatch, 976 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo.App.1998). Claimant claims Missouri jurisdiction because her employer and United Van Lines entered into an agreement that was finalized in Missouri. Although the final steps of an agreement between United Van Lines and John Pizzo Trucking occurred in Fenton, Missouri, there is no basis to find that relationship was a "contract of employment." Claimant testified the nature of the relationship between was a "lease" relationship. John Pizzo testified he was self-employed as a lease operator or contractor, and Claimant was just an employee of his sole proprietorship. Even if the broad interpretation of "under contract of employment " advocated by Claimant allowed the contact in question to be that of third party, there was no evidence that a "contract of employment" existed between United Van Lines and John Pizzo Trucking. There is no direct or indirect employment contract under which Claimant was injured on which to base Missouri jurisdiction.
Finally, if the employee's employment was principally localized in Missouri, jurisdiction would attach to the claim. For many of the same reasons discussed above, Claimant cannot establish the "employee's employment was principally localized in this state" at any relevant time. In Gabriel v. Burlington Motor Carriers and AIU Insurance Co., Injury No. 97-013677 (August 31, 1998)(1998 WL 559966, 2), the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission turned for guidance to the National Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws Model Act, which defines "principally localized" as follows:
(1) A person's employment is principally localized in this or another State when his employer has a place of business in this or such other State and he regularly works at or from such place of business, or
(2) If clause (1) foregoing is not applicable, he is domiciled and spends a substantial part of his working time in the service of his employer in this or such other State.
Since it is definitely established Claimant's employer was John Pizzo Trucking, not United Van Lines, there is no evidence to support a finding under the first prong of the principally localized test. As for the second prong, neither Claimant nor Employer was domiciled in Missouri, nor did they spend a substantial part of their working time in Missouri. Claimant simply does not meet the statutory mandate for Missouri jurisdiction.
The fact Employer/Insurer consented to Missouri jurisdiction in settling the primary claim does not bind the Second Injury Fund. In Liberty v. Treasurer for State of MissouriCustodian of Second Injury Fund, 218 S.W.3d 7, 13 (Mo.App. W.D. 2007), the court addressed a situation where, as here, the employer settled, stipulating to jurisdiction, and the Second Injury Fund raised the jurisdiction defense. The court found the Second Injury Fund is entitled to all available defenses in all cases, stating, "[t]o claim lack of jurisdiction is to assert one of the most fundamental of defenses." Id at 14. Because the Fund was not a party to that settlement, it is not bound by those stipulations. Id, citing Totten v. Treasurer of Mo., 116 S.W.3d 624, 628 (Mo.App. 2003) (admission of settlement agreement as evidence does not bind the Fund to the terms of the agreement to which it was not a party).