The parties readily acknowledge that the April 5, 2010, accident caused the employee to suffer certain permanent disability. The parties, however, dispute whether the employee is permanently and totally disabled; and, if so, whether he is permanently and totally disabled as a consequence of the work injury, considered alone. The adjudication of this issue requires consideration of Section 287.020.6, RSMo, and applicable case law. Section 287.020.6, RSMo 1994 states:
The term 'total disability' as used in this chapter [Chapter 287] shall mean inability to return to any employment and not merely mean inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident.
In giving meaning to this provision the courts have provided instruction and guidance. "The test for permanent total disability is whether, given the claimant's situation and condition, he or she is a competent to compete in the open labor market. [citation omitted] The question is whether an employer in the usual course of business would reasonably be expected to hire the claimant in the claimant's present physical condition, reasonably expecting the claimant to perform the work for which he or she is hire." Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo. App. 1992).
Also, where permanent total disability is alleged, the Administrative Law Judge must first consider the liability of the employer in isolation by determining the degree of disability due to the last injury. APAC Kansas, Inc. v. Smith, 227 S.W.3d 1,4 (Mo. App.W.D. 2007). If the claimant (employee) is not permanently and totally disabled from the last accident, then the degree of disability attributable to all injures is determined. 227 S.W.3d at 4. Further, in considering employer liability several additional principles bear reprise.
The inability to return to any employment means the inability to perform the usual duties of the employment in a manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employment. Gordon v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 908 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995). In determining whether the claimant can return to employment, Missouri law allows the consideration of the claimant's age and education, along with physical abilities. BAXI v. United Technologies Automotive, 956 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997). While "total disability" does not require that the claimant be completely inactive or inert, Sifferman v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 906 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996), overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. Banc 2003), it does require a finding that the employee is unable to work in any employment in the open labor market, and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. Sullivan v. Masters Jackson Paving Co., 35 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. banc 2003). The central question is: In the ordinary course of business, would any employer reasonably be expected to hire Claimant in his [or her] physical condition? Ransburg v. Great Plains Drilling, 22 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Mo. App. W.D.2000) overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. banc 2003).
In asserting his claim, Mr. Barker contends that the work injury of April 5, 2010, causes him to be governed by work restrictions that restrict him to less than full sedentary work, and these restrictions in combination with his inability to read and write, render him unemployable in the open and competitive labor market. Mr. Barker relies principally upon the medical opinion of Dr. Volarich, the medical opinion of Dr. Jordan (who adopted the physical exertion limitations of the May 2, 2011, FCE and permanently restricted Mr. Barker to lifting 14 pounds occasionally, 7 pounds frequently, and 3 pounds constantly), and the vocational opinion of Mr. Eldred. The employee further asserts that if the restrictions imposed by Dr. Jordan are accepted as true, even Mr. England (vocational expert for employer and insurer) opines that he is unemployable in the open and competitive labor market.
The employer and insurer dispute Mr. Barker's contention that he is permanently and totally disabled. Although acknowledging that Mr. Barker sustained an acute injury on April 5, 2010, the employer and insurer assert that the work injury does not cause the employee to be
governed by work restrictions. In this regard, the employer and insurer rely principally upon the medical opinions of Dr. Mcqueary and the vocational opinion of Mr. England. In this context, the employer and insurer assert that Dr. Mcqueary did not impose any permanent work restrictions relative to the work injury, and Dr. Mcqueary limits Mr. Barker only to not operating a dump truck or backhoe. And assuming no more than these restrictions, the employer and insurer contend, Mr. England opines that the employee is employable in the open and competitive labor market.
The employer and insurer further contend that the greatest obstacle to the employee finding employment is his illiteracy, which the employer and insurer acknowledge is a significant obstacle to employment (or potential employment), as evidenced by the employer declining to employ Mr. Barker in certain sedentary employment positions without him first obtaining greater literacy skills. Notably, the employer and insurer acknowledge that the medical records and evidence presented by the parties do not indicate that this illiteracy is causally related to a learning disability or otherwise a medical condition that would support a claim of permanent disability. ${ }^{4}$
Thusly, the employer and insurer argue that while Mr. Barker's illiteracy may be a hindrance or obstacle to him obtaining employment, his inability to read or write cannot be considered as a factor in determining whether he is permanently and totally disabled, insofar as it is not a learning disability and not a permanent disability. The employer and insurer premise this argument on Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 941 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Mo. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003). This argument and the employer and insurer reliance on Tiller, however, are misplaced. The principle enunciated in Tiller relates to factors appropriate for consideration of Second Injury Fund liability. In determining Second Injury Fund liability, without showing that an employee's illiteracy or inability to read and write relates to a learning disability, then the condition cannot be a permanent disability. And if it is not a permanent disability, then it cannot be a factor in determining Second Injury Fund liability.
Notwithstanding, illiteracy or inability to read and write is a factor and relevant consideration for determining whether an employee is employable in the open and competitive labor market. Adjudication of a person's employability in the open and competitive labor market requires the Division (or judge) to continue to evaluate each employee as he or she presents himself or herself before the division (or court), including giving consideration to not only the employee's inability to read or write, but the employee's age, education, job experience and skills (none of which is a preexisting permanent disability) in determining whether the employee is employable in the open and competitive labor market. Thus, in taking Mr. Barker as we find him at the time of the April 5, 2010, accident, consideration must be given to his inability to read and write, as well as his age, education, job experience and skills, in determining whether the
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[^0]: ${ }^{4}$ Apparently, neither party secured an examination to determine whether Mr. Barker suffers a learning disability. Mr. England appears to have understood this concern, and solicited school records to determine whether Mr. Barker had previously being diagnosed with a learning disability. These records reflected Mr. Barker being in special education classes, but never referenced or established the existence of a learning disability diagnosis. Mr. England thus refers to Mr. Barker's illiteracy as "learning problems." Accordingly, while Mr. Barker may have learning problems, and may suffer from a learning disability, the evidence does not allow a finding of Mr. Barker having a "learning disability." Any such finding would be speculative and disallowed for adjudication of Mr. Barker's permanent disability.
injury caused by the April 5, 2010, accident, considered alone, renders him unemployable in the open and competitive labor market. See, Karoutzos v. Treasurer of State, 55 S.W.3d 493, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003).
Mr. Barker's illiteracy, as well as his age and education (or lack thereof), seriously impair his employability. In many respects, Mr. Barker is the "egg shell" plaintiff (or claimant) that is commonly referred to in law school to explain the concept and significance of taking individuals as you find them. Because most workers enjoy a significant higher level of literacy than that possessed by Mr. Barker, most employees would not be rendered unemployable by an injury that changes their employment status from having no work restrictions and being permitted to engage in heavy work to having work restrictions and being limited to sedentary work. However, unlike most individuals, Mr. Barker may be rendered unemployable by suffering an injury that produces lesser restrictions; because he is illiterate, 62 years of age and lacks any education beyond the $6^{\text {th }}$ grade.
In light of the foregoing, the determination of whether Mr. Barker is permanently and totally disabled depends significantly on which physician opinion, and the specific restrictions prescribed, are accepted as true by the undersigned judge to govern Mr. Barker's activities. Only if it is determined that the restrictions governing Mr. Barker are limited to those prescribed by Dr. Mcqueary or Dr. Glas, which excludes not only the restrictions imposed by Dr. Volarich but the restrictions imposed by Dr. Jordan (who adopted the physical exertion limitations of the May 2, 2011, FCE and permanently restricted Mr. Barker to lifting 14 pounds occasionally, 7 pounds frequently, and 3 pounds constantly), may Mr. Barker be adjudicated as being employable in the open and competitive labor market.
In addressing this issue, it is noteworthy that Mr. Barker enjoys an excellent work history up to the date of the April 5, 2010, work injury, and this work history is exceptionally long. While in the $6^{\text {th }}$ grade and at approximately 12 years of age, Mr. Barker was taken out of school in order to provide financial and other support for his family. For all intents and purposes, at this early age Mr. Barker embarked on adulthood; he assumed the responsibilities of a working adult and began working full-time. And for the next 50 years he continued to engage in regular employment, consistently performing heavy physical labor.
At the time of his work injury, Mr. Barker was performing physical work as he had done for the prior 50 years. Prior to April 5, 2010, Mr. Barker successfully performed his job duties, which included driving dump trucks, operating a backhoe, installing culverts weighing 150 pounds, and gripping tools that weighed up to 45 pounds. He worked eight hours a day, five days a week, and averaged 40 hours per week.
This work history and work ethic possessed by Mr. Barker enjoys corroboration from Mr. Barker's wife of 38 years, Rebecca Barker. Mrs. Barker testified that she did not work outside the home during their marriage. Rather, she relied upon Mr. Barker's long and steady record of employment for their family's financial support. She further testified and confirmed that Mr. Barker is unable to read and write, and his employment involved heavy physical labor.
In evaluating the evidence I note that Mr. Barker appeared at trial and provided testimony regarding his medical conditions, restrictions, and daily activities. This testimony includes statements by him that he continues to experience ongoing difficulties and problems as a result of the injury of April 5, 2010. He complains of pain, lost motion, spasm, stiffness and diminished endurance with his low back. Additionally, he notes that he continues to experience pain, numbness and tingling that extends into his right lower extremity. He further states:
- The affect of these symptoms make it difficult for him to stand, walk, run, and climb; he has difficulty walking on uneven ground, bending and lifting.
- He has difficulty squatting, stooping, kneeling, crawling, and prolonged exposure to fixed positions as well as pushing and pulling maneuvers that require twisting of his lumbar and cervical spine.
- His activities of daily living are affected as well. Driving his personal vehicle is difficult especially if he has to drive on long trips or over bumpy roads.
- He has difficulty getting in and out of a bathtub due to back pain and has difficulty putting on socks and shoes.
- He awakens from sleep due to low back and right leg pain and has difficulty doing house work such as carrying groceries or laundry.
Yet, is Mr. Barker believable? Are his symptoms and complaints of pain, as well as his limitations and restrictions real? The employer and insurer suggest no, arguing that Mr. and Mrs. Barker own 30 to 35 cattle, and Mr. Barker performs work associated with the care and feeding of the cattle. The employer and insurer further suggest that Mr. Barker is not working because he lacks the motivation to work. In this regard, the employer and insurer note that the employer offered to provide Mr. Barker with literacy classes, and upon learning to read and write he would have sedentary employment opportunities with Laclede County.
Mr. Barker responded to this concern noting that the work with the cattle involved minimal physical labor, as he could use the equipment to do most of the work. Further, Mr. Barker noted that the cattle have always been owned and managed by his wife, while he engaged in employment outside of the home, and she provided care for the cattle as well. Additionally, Mr. Barker noted that he was not required to move quickly or work continuously without taking time to rest and engage in this activity at his own pace. Also, Mr. Barker noted that at times during the day he has the opportunity to lie down, and the nature and severity of his pain requires him during most days to lie down.
As to the question of being offered literacy classes, Mr. Barker initially denied being offered the opportunity to learn to read and write. Later, he indicated that he did not know or understand the meaning of "literacy classes", but continued to assert that no one offered to help him learn to read or use a computer. In considering this issue, I do not doubt that the employer offered to provide Mr. Barker with literacy classes, and the employer should be commended for making such an offer. Yet, the offer occurred in the context of litigation and the employer and insurer defending against a claim of permanent total disability. Further, considering Mr. Barker's
age, and 50 plus years of struggling without having any ability to read and write, it is understandable that Mr. Barker would not be eager or desirous to pursue such a program, particularly if he is not receiving any income or temporary disability compensation. The response of Mr. Barker is not viewed by the undersigned as a lack of work ethic or desire not to work.
In light of the foregoing, having reviewed and considered all the evidence, as well as having had an opportunity to observe in person Mr. Barker at the hearing, I find Mr. Barker credible, reliable and worthy of belief. It is noteworthy that Mr. Barker's physicians, as well as the vocational experts, including Mr. England, found Mr. Barker to be likeable and credible. I thus accept substantially as true Mr. Barker's complaints of pain and limitations. ${ }^{5}$ I find that Mr. Barker worked a physically demanding job without limitations up to the date of the last injury. He performed this work without limitations until sustaining the April 5, 2010, accident and suffering the injury to his low back.
The work injury of April 5, 2010, causes Mr. Barker to be governed by restrictions and limitations. In seeking to identify the work restrictions appropriate for Mr. Barker, the employer and insurer arranged for Mr. Barker to undergo a functional capacity evaluation prescribed by Dr. Jordan, a treating physician selected by the employer and insurer. This FCE was performed on or about May 2, 2011, at St. John's in Lebanon, Missouri. The results of this evaluation indicated that Mr. Barker demonstrated no symptom magnification. It further indicated that Mr. Barker did not have any tolerance for any repetitive activities despite good effort, and that his material handling fitness was poor.
As a consequence of this FCE, it was recommended that Mr. Barker be given restrictions that limited his lifting to be 14 - 17 pounds occasionally, 7 - 9 pounds frequently, and 3 pounds constantly. The results of this FCE further note that Mr. Barker would be unable to perform at these levels over an extended period of time. And following this FCE, on May 5, 2011, Mr. Barker presented to Dr. James Jordan, who adopted the physical exertional limitations of the FCE.
The physicians offer differing opinions as to the restrictions governing Mr. Barker. Having found Mr. Barker credible, and accepting as true his complaints of pain and limitations, I resolve the differences in medical opinion in favor of Dr. Jordan. In this regard, Dr. Jordan is a treating physician selected by the employer and insurer. Further, Dr. Jordan is a physician practicing in occupational medicine, which affords to him particular expertise in prescribing work restrictions. Additionally, in adopting the restrictions and limitations recommended by the FCE, Dr. Jordan issued permanent restrictions, which, in combination with Mr. Barker's illiteracy, remove Mr. Barker from being employable in the open and competitive labor market. The FCE, and the permanent restrictions adopted by Dr. Jordan, corroborate substantially and independently the testimony of Mr. Barker.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that as a consequence of the April 5, 2010, work injury, Mr. Barker is governed by the permanent restrictions prescribed by Dr. Jordan. Based on these
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[^0]: ${ }^{5}$ Although Mr. Barker states that he lies down each day, and considers this need to be part of his self-imposed work restrictions, the need to lie down during the day is not a permanent work restriction prescribed by Dr. Jordan. Thus, in accepting Dr. Jordan's restrictions, I would not make the need to lie down a permanent work restriction governing Mr. Barker's work activity.
restrictions, Mr. Barker is limited to lifting 14 - 17 pounds occasionally, 7- 9 pounds frequently, and 3 pounds constantly. According to Mr. England, the vocational expert secured by the employer and insurer, these restrictions, in combination with the limitations caused by his illiteracy, Mr. Barker is rendered unemployable in the open and competitive labor market. Thus, both vocational experts agree that if the restrictions prescribed by Dr. Jordan are accepted as the restrictions governing Mr. Barker, then Mr. Barker is permanently and totally disabled.
Therefore, after consideration and review of the evidence, I find and conclude that the physical restrictions caused by the accident of April 5, 2010, in combination with the limitations caused by his illiteracy, the employee is unemployable in the open and competitive labor market. Similarly, I find and conclude that as a consequence of the accident of April 5, 2010, considered alone, the employee is permanently and totally disabled. The employer and insurer are thus ordered to pay to the employee, Lester Barker, the sum of $\ 340.55 per week for the employee's lifetime. The payment of permanent total disability compensation by the employer and insurer is effective as of May 5, 2011, when he reached maximum medical improvement. (It is on this date that Dr. Jordan determined that Mr. Barker was at maximum medical improvement and prescribed permanent work restrictions.)
In rendering this decision, I am not unmindful of the unique challenges and concerns that this decision may bring. To be sure, the physical restrictions produced by the work injury of April 5, 2010, considered alone, would not render Mr. Barker unemployable. Without consideration of Mr. Barker's illiteracy, in combination with the work injury, Mr. Barker would be employable in the open and competitive labor market. However, Mr. Barker's inability to read and write, which has burdened him for more than 50 years, must be considered in determining his employability. And the employer and insurer, in this case, failed to prove that Mr. Barker's illiteracy was caused by a learning disability - a concern noted by the employer and insurer's vocational expert. Without such evidence of a learning disability, the employer and insurer may not legally shift liability to the Second Injury Fund for Mr. Barker being unemployable. ${ }^{6}$
An attorney's fee of 25 percent of the benefits ordered to be paid is hereby approved, and shall be a lien against the proceeds until paid. Interest as provided by law is applicable. The Award is subject to modifications as provided by law.
Made by: $\qquad$
L. Timothy Wilson
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
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[^0]: ${ }^{6}$ Although the adjudication of this claim did not include a Claim for Compensation against the Second Injury Fund, the employer and insurer would not have been precluded from defending it liability by establishing and presenting evidence to support a defense that liability for permanent total disability should lie with the Second Injury Fund.