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Victor Barnhill v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.

Decision date: March 14, 201422 pages

Summary

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission modified the administrative law judge's award regarding the nature and extent of permanent disability and Second Injury Fund liability for employee Victor Barnhill. The Commission affirmed temporary total disability benefits from October 4, 2003, to October 11, 2005, but modified calculations for permanent partial disability across multiple body parts (shoulder, lumbar spine, cervical spine).

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This workers' comp decision may point to a separate injury claim.

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Caption

FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Modifying Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge)
Employee:Victor Barnhill
Employer:Yellow Freight System, Inc.
Insurer:Self-Insured
Additional Party:Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund
This workers’ compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. We have reviewed the evidence, read the parties’briefs, and considered the whole record. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we modify the award and decision of the administrative law judge. We adopt the findings, conclusions, decision, and award of the administrative law judge to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, decision, and modifications set forth below.
Preliminaries
The parties asked the administrative law judge to resolve the following issues:(1) whether employer is liable to provide employee with future medical care; (2) whether employee is entitled to recover temporary total disability benefits from the period of time beginning October 4, 2003, to October 11, 2005; (3) the nature and extent of employee’s permanent disability; and (4) the liability of the Second Injury Fund.The administrative law judge rendered the following findings and conclusions: (1) employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from October 4, 2003, to October 11, 2005; (2) employee is not entitled to future medical treatment to cure and relieve from the effects of his injuries; (3) as a result of the primary injury, employee sustained 27.5% permanent partial disability of the left shoulder, 15% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole referable to the lumbar spine, and 15% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole referable to the cervical spine, and employee’s compensation for permanent partial disability is subject to a 10% multiplicity factor to account for cumulative disabilities resulting from his multiple injuries; and (4) the Second Injury Fund is liable for 82.75 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. The administrative law judge also noted that the compensation she awarded to employee as against the employer is subject, per stipulation of the parties, to a credit in favor of the employer in the amount of $17,298.64.Employee filed a timely Application for Review with the Commission alleging the administrative law judge erred: (1) in finding employee is not permanently and totally disabled; (2) in sustaining employer’s evidentiary objection to employee’s Exhibit I; and (3) in finding employee is not entitled to future medical treatment.Employer filed a timely Application for Review with the Commission alleging the administrative law judge erred: (1) in awarding past temporary total disability benefits to employee; and (2) in determining the nature and extent of employee’s permanent partial disability resulting from the work injury.

On July 23, 2013, the Commission received a Motion to Submit Additional Evidence filed by employee. On October 3, 2013, the Commission denied employee's Motion to Submit Additional Evidence.

For the reasons stated below, we modify the award of the administrative law judge referable to the issues of: (1) the nature and extent of employee's permanent disability; and (2) the liability of the Second Injury Fund.

Temporary total disability

We agree with the administrative law judge's determination that employee was unable to compete for work in the open labor market from October 4, 2003, to October 11, 2005, but discern a need for some clarifying comments and analysis. Accordingly, we hereby supplement the administrative law judge's findings pertinent to this issue as follows.

The administrative law judge stated, on page 10 of her award, that Dr. Emanuel, the treating surgeon, opined that employee was temporarily and totally disabled as a result of the accident on May 22, 2003, up until the date Dr. Emanuel performed surgery on employee's left shoulder on October 12, 2005, because of the physical restrictions from Dr. Kennedy combined with the restrictions Dr. Emanuel himself imposed. After a thorough review of the record, we were unable to locate an opinion from Dr. Emanuel referencing Dr. Kennedy's restrictions as affecting his own opinion regarding temporary total disability; accordingly we must hereby disclaim this finding by the administrative law judge.

Employer argues, in its brief, that Dr. Emanuel solely opined regarding employee's ability to work as a truck driver during the time period at issue, and did not provide an opinion whether employee would be unable to perform any job. After a careful review of the transcript, we find this characterization of Dr. Emanuel's opinion to be inaccurate. Although Dr. Emanuel did specifically opine that employee would be unable to return to work as a truck driver during the period at issue, he also opined that employee was temporarily and "totally" disabled during that time period. Transcript, page 122. Employer had an opportunity, at Dr. Emanuel's deposition, to ask Dr. Emanuel to clarify whether he was solely opining regarding employee's ability to work as a truck driver. But Dr. Emanuel was simply asked whether there was no doubt in his mind that employee could not go back to work as a truck driver during the period at issue; Dr. Emanuel agreed. Given these circumstances, we view Dr. Emanuel's testimony as supportive of an award of temporary total disability benefits.

We credit the testimony from employee's vocational expert, J. Stephen Dolan, (and so find) that employee would have been limited to unskilled, entry-level jobs given the restrictions from the treating physicians Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Emanuel during the time period at issue. We also credit the testimony from employee (and so find) that, during the time period at issue, employee attempted to find work at a number of unskilled, entry-level jobs, but was unsuccessful. When we consider these facts along with the opinion from Dr. Emanuel, we are persuaded that the administrative law judge correctly determined that employee was temporarily and totally disabled from October 4, 2003, to October 11, 2005. Accordingly, we affirm the award holding employer liable for temporary total disability benefits.

Permanent total disability

After careful consideration, we deem appropriate and hereby affirm and adopt the administrative law judge's findings with respect to the nature and extent of permanent partial disability employee sustained as a result of the primary injury. The administrative law judge determined that employee is not permanently and totally disabled. We acknowledge that the record contains evidence to support this finding by the administrative law judge, but we disagree for the following reasons.

At the hearing, employee described his subjective complaints and limitations at length; his testimony is accurately recounted in the administrative law judge's award. While the administrative law judge found lacking in credibility a restriction from employee's primary care physician, Dr. Farmer, that employee must be permitted to lie down during the day, she did not indicate whether she believed employee's own testimony that he has a need to lie down during the day. After careful consideration, we find employee's testimony to be credible on this point. We note that employee cited pain as the primary factor motivating his need to lie down during the day; we note also employee's credible testimony that his pain stems from the effects of the primary injury as well as a preexisting right lower extremity injury. Employee also cited fatigue referable to his preexisting cardiac condition as contributing to his need to lie down during the day.

Considering these factors, and in light of the absence of any opinion from a treating or evaluating physician linking employee's need to lie down during the day to the effects of the primary injury considered in isolation, we find that employee's need to lie down during the day does not result solely from the effects of the primary injury, but instead from a combination of his pain resulting from the primary injury and his preexisting right lower extremity injury, as well as fatigue caused by his preexisting cardiac condition.

The administrative law judge accurately recounted the testimony from employer's vocational expert, Mr. England. We supplement her findings by noting that Mr. England credibly opined (and we so find) that the only transferable skills employee has from his past vocational history are his ability to drive trucks and his knowledge of the trucking industry. We note also that Mr. England appeared to focus on identifying jobs that employee could hypothetically perform within the physical restrictions imposed by the various treating and evaluating physicians, rather than the more relevant question (for our purposes, at least) whether employee could effectively compete for and obtain such jobs on the open labor market. Ultimately, Mr. England conceded that if Dr. Volarich's opinions were accepted by the fact-finder, employee would be considered permanently and totally disabled from a medical standpoint as a result of the primary injury in combination with his preexisting conditions of ill-being; Mr. England made clear that he wasn't arguing with Dr. Volarich's medical findings.

We supplement the administrative law judge's findings referable to the testimony from employee's vocational expert, Mr. Dolan, as follows. Mr. Dolan was seemingly unaware of the extent of employee's preexisting disability referable to the right lower extremity, and did not recall if he asked employee whether his preexisting cardiovascular issues affected his vocational abilities in the time period leading up to the primary injury. Given these deficiencies, we are not persuaded by Mr. Dolan's ultimate opinion assigning permanent total disability to the primary injury alone. We do, however, find Mr. Dolan's testimony persuasive to the extent he opined that it's very unlikely any employer would

hire employee given the restrictions assigned by Dr. Volarich referable to the primary injury and employee's preexisting conditions of ill-being.

We note that both vocational experts agreed that a need to lie down during the day would preclude employee from securing work in the open labor market. In light of the foregoing considerations, we ultimately find most persuasive the opinion from Dr. Volarich (and so find) that employee is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the effects of the primary injury in combination with employee's preexisting disabling conditions of ill-being.

Second Injury Fund liability

Section 287.220 RSMo creates the Second Injury Fund and provides when and what compensation shall be paid in "all cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability." As a preliminary matter, the employee must show that he suffers from "a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed..." Id. The Missouri courts have articulated the following test for determining whether a preexisting disability constitutes a "hindrance or obstacle to employment":

[T]he proper focus of the inquiry is not on the extent to which the condition has caused difficulty in the past; it is on the potential that the condition may combine with a work-related injury in the future so as to cause a greater degree of disability than would have resulted in the absence of the condition.

Knisley v. Charleswood Corp., 211 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Mo. App. 2007)(citation omitted).

We find appropriate and hereby adopt the administrative law judge's findings with respect to the nature and extent of permanent partial disability employee suffered as a result of his preexisti

Full decision text continues in the plain-text archive copy.

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