Employee lives at 3511 NE Stanton Street in Lee's Summit, Missouri. Employee worked as a supervisor for employer, Jackson County, Missouri. Because supervisors are sometimes required to respond to after-hours emergencies, employer allows supervisors - including employee - to drive employer-owned vehicles to and from work.
Employer has many offices. The majority of employer's administrative and executive offices are located at 415 E. $12^{\text {th }} Street, Kansas City, Missouri. Employer offices located at 415 E. 12^{\text {th }}$ Street include the county executive's office, the assessment office, the
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2011, unless otherwise indicated.
Enployee: John Jansen
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collection office, the human resources office, and the finance and purchasing office.
Employee worked at employer's office at 8100 E. Park Road in Lee's Summit, Missouri.
On the morning of April 5, 2012, employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident while he was driving from his home to his designated office at 8100 E. Park Road in a vehicle owned and maintained by employer.
**Law**
Section 287.020.3 provides:
(1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. "The prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
Section 287.020.5 provides:
Injuries sustained in company-owned or subsidized automobiles in accidents that occur while traveling from the employee's home to the employer's principal place of business or from the employer's principal place of business to the employee's home are not compensable. The extension of premises doctrine is abrogated to the extent it extends liability for accidents that occur on property not owned or controlled by the employer even if the accident occurs on customary, approved, permitted, usual or accepted routes used by the employee to get to and from their place of employment.
**Discussion**
The parties stipulated that employee sustained a motor vehicle accident in Jackson County, Missouri on April 5, 2012. The parties agree that employee was driving in an employer-owned vehicle at the time of the accident. Employer contends that compensability of employee's injury is barred by § 287.020.5 because employee's accident occurred while he was traveling from his home to his principal place of business. Employee contends he was not traveling to employer's principal place of business, so § 287.020.5 is not applicable.
Prior to 2005, the general rule in Missouri was that injuries sustained while traveling to or from work were not compensable.² There were numerous exceptions to this so-called
² See *Garrett v. Industrial Commission*, 600 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. App. 1980).
Injury No.: 12-024808
going and coming rule. Inasmuch as amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law in 2005 specifically abrogated all prior case law definition of "arising out of and in the course of employment"3 and simultaneously deleted the statutory directive that it did not cover workers except while engaged in or about the premises where their duties are being performed or where their services require their presence as a part of such service, ${ }^{4}$ it remains to be seen to what extent, if any, the judicially-created going and coming rule or any of its exceptions survive.
The administrative law judge analyzed the first sentence of $\S 287.020 .5$ and concluded:
In this particular case, [employee]'s route to work and the actual work location is his customary office. There was no evidence presented that [employee] was required to report or reported for work at the Jackson County 415 E. Street [sic] office. ${ }^{5}$ As such, when [employee] had his car accident traveling to the satellite office, he was traveling from his home to his office. The fact remains that the Employee was traveling from home to his place of work; and, therefore, his claim is not compensable.
Under the administrative law judge's reasoning, wherever an injured worker customarily works is the worker's "employer's principal place of business." The administrative law judge's ruling is directly contrary to the only appellate decision considering the meaning of the phrase "employer's principal place of business" as it appears in § 287.020.5.
The court in Harness v. Southern Copyroll, Inc., ${ }^{6}$ was confronted with the question of what constitutes an "employer's principal place of business" and answered thusly:
Appellants' argument is based upon the premise that $\S 287.020 .5$ would permit one employer to have more than one principal place of business. That premise is flawed. There is no statutory definition for the phrase "principal place of business" as used in § 287.020.5. When a statutory term is not defined, courts apply the ordinary meaning of the term as found in the dictionary. Because the word "principal" was used by the General Assembly to modify the phrase "place of business," we must give effect to that limitation. The word "principal" is defined by BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) to mean: "Chief; primary; most important." Id. at 1230. Therefore, giving the phrase "the employer's principal place of business" a strict construction as we must, § 287.020.5 only authorizes the employer to have one principal place of business. ${ }^{7}$
The Harness case involved only two identified "places of business," whereas, the instant case involves a large employer with numerous offices. The administrative law judge, obviously and reasonably, perceived that adoption of the Harness rationale in cases such as this will inevitably limit (and randomize) the application of $\S 287.020 .5$. Like the court in Harness, we are constrained by the mandate of strict construction and cannot disregard the plain language of $\S 287.020 .5$ to achieve a result we may deem more just or prudent.
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[^0]: ${ }^{3} Section 287.020.10 RSMo.
{ }^{4} Section 287.020.5 RSMo.
{ }^{5}$ The administrative law judge omitted a portion of the address. The correct address is 415 E. $12^{\text {th }} Street.
{ }^{6} 291 S.W.3d 299 (Mo. App. 2009).
{ }^{7}$ Id., at 304-305 (some internal citations omitted).
Based upon the holding in Harness, employer can have but one principal place of business. Under the facts in this case, we find employer's principal place of business is 415 E. $12^{\text {th }}$ Street, Kansas City, Missouri. We, therefore, find that on the morning of April 5, 2012, employee was not traveling from his home to employer's principal place of business.