Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge awarding costs under § 287.560 RSMo against this employer should be affirmed.
As its rationale for reversing the award of costs, the majority cites the fact that contemporaneous medical records report employee having shut his hand in a car door, rather than having injured himself while working for employer. The majority posits that this circumstance provided employer with a reasonable ground for its denial of this claim. I find a number of problems with this.
First, the majority ignores the case law which holds that " $[t]$ here is no requirement that the medical records report employment as the source of injury." Daly v. Powell Distrib., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Mo. App. 2010). There are many good reasons for this rule, the most compelling of which is that the unsworn statements of the oftentimes unidentified individuals within the healthcare system who create these records simply are not entitled to more weight than the sworn and cross-examined testimony of an employee before an administrative law judge. Especially here, where we are dealing with records generated in the course of employee's treatment in the emergency department of a large hospital, the reliability of these hearsay statements strikes me as highly suspect.
The majority also ignores employee's testimony that he was in shock when he arrived at the hospital. As the administrative law judge noted, contemporaneous photographs of the violent mutilation of the middle finger on employee's left hand are included in evidence. Especially in light of this evidence, I find eminently credible employee's testimony that he was in shock and that he wasn't really aware of what he initially said or did once he arrived at the hospital. If indeed employee did tell the emergency personnel and treating physicians that he injured his hand in a car door, he did so because he was in shock and was not fully aware of what was taking place. I also agree with the administrative law judge's assessment that there is no possible way that employee could have suffered the injury seen in these photographs by shutting his hand in a car door. For these reasons, along with the fact that the medical records reveal employee still had his work glove on his left hand when he arrived at the hospital, and the admissions on the part of employer's sole witness that he discovered blood on the floor where employee was working, I conclude that the issue is clear, and that employer had no reasonable ground whatsoever for disputing the issue of accident.
Second, the majority ignores that employer waited until the day of the hearing to dispute the issue of notice, and thereafter failed to present any evidence that would support a finding that employee failed to provide written notice or that employer was prejudiced as a result. As the administrative law judge points out, employer had absolutely no ground for disputing this issue where the records of the Division of Workers' Compensation reveal that it received a copy of employee's claim for compensation within thirty days of the injury, because that document unquestionably amounted to written notice of
Employee's injury meeting each of the criteria required under § 287.420 RSMo. At minimum, employer has unreasonably defended this claim with respect to the issue of notice, and thus an award of costs is proper.
Third, the majority ignores that in its brief to this Commission, employer acts egregiously in misstating the record. For example, on page 7 of its brief, employer asserts that its witness, the supervisor Rick Cavallaro, testified that there was no blood on the machine where employee was working, but fails to note that this witness also specifically testified that he didn't even check the machine. See Transcript, page 112. Employer's lack of candor toward this tribunal reveals an absence of good faith and is emblematic of the type of behavior that an award of costs under $\S 287.560$ is designed to prevent.
I would affirm the award of the administrative law judge ordering employer to pay attorney's fees for its unreasonable and egregious behavior in defending this claim. Because the majority has determined otherwise, I respectfully dissent from that part of the Commission's decision.
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member