Claimant seeks an Award of permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund. In the alternative, claimant argues that if the Tribunal finds that claimant is permanently and totally disabled due to the last injury alone, then claimant is still entitled to permanent partial disability benefits against the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{28}$
Under Missouri Workers' Compensation law, the claimant bears the burden of proving all essential elements of his or her workers' compensation claim. ${ }^{29}$ Proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence, and may not rest on speculation. ${ }^{30}$ Medical causation not within lay understanding or experience requires expert medical evidence. ${ }^{31}$ When medical theories conflict, deciding which to accept is an issue reserved for the determination of the fact finder. ${ }^{32}$
In addition, the fact finder may accept only part of the testimony of a medical expert and reject the remainder of it. ${ }^{33}$ Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony that it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. ${ }^{34}$
Section 287.020.7, RSMo, provides that "total disability" is the inability to return to any employment and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. ${ }^{35}$ The main factor in this determination is whether, in the ordinary course of business, any employer would reasonably be expected to employ the employee in this present physical condition and reasonably expect him to perform the duties of
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[^0]: ${ }^{25}$ Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App. W.D. 1990); Grime v. Altec Indus., 83 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Mo.App. 2002).
${ }^{26} Meilves v. Morris, 422 S.W.2d 335, 399 (Mo. 1968).
{ }^{27} Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. W.D. 1974).
{ }^{28}$ If claimant is permanently and totally disabled due to the last injury alone, the Second Injury Fund bears no liability. Roller v. Treasurer of the State of Mo., 935 S.W.2d 739, 742-743 (Mo.App. 1996).
${ }^{29}$ Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo.App. W.D. 1990); Grime v. Altec Indus., 83 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Mo. App. 2002).
${ }^{30} Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. W.D. 1974).
{ }^{31} Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 1994).
{ }^{32} Hawkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 977 (Mo.App. 1984).
{ }^{33} Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo.App. 1957).
{ }^{34}$ Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App. 1992); Hutchinson v. Tri State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Mo. App. 1986).
${ }^{35}$ See also Houston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004).
the work for which he was hired. ${ }^{36}$ The test for permanent and total disability is whether the claimant would be able to compete in the open labor market. ${ }^{37}$ When the claimant is disabled by a combination of the work-related event and pre-existing disabilities, the responsibility for benefits lies with the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{38}$ If the last injury in and of itself renders a claimant permanently and totally disabled, the Second Injury Fund has no liability and the employer is responsible for the entire compensation. ${ }^{39}$
In order to find permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund, it is necessary that the employee suffer from a permanent partial disability as the result of the last compensable injury, and that the disability has combined with a prior permanent partial disability to result in total disability. ${ }^{40}$
Where a pre-existing permanent partial disability combines with a work-related permanent partial disability to cause permanent total disability, the Second Injury Fund is liable for compensation due the employee for the permanent total disability after the employer has paid the compensation due the employee for the disability resulting from the work-related injury. ${ }^{41}$ In determining the extent of disability attributable to the employer and the Second Injury Fund, an administrative law judge must determine the extent of the compensable injury first. ${ }^{42}$ If the compensable injury results in permanent total disability, no further inquiry into Second Injury Fund liability is made. ${ }^{43}$ Therefore, it is necessary that the employee's last injury be closely evaluated and scrutinized to determine if it alone results in permanent total disability and not permanent partial disability.
Various factors have been considered by courts attempting to determine whether or not an employee is permanently totally disabled. It is not necessary that an injured employee be rendered, or remain, wholly or completely inactive, inert or helpless in order to be entitled to receive compensation for permanent total disability. ${ }^{44}$ An employee's ability or inability to perform simple physical tasks such as sitting, ${ }^{45} bending, twisting, { }^{46} and walking { }^{47}$ may prove that the employee is permanently totally disabled. An employee's age may also be taken into consideration. ${ }^{48}$
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[^0]: ${ }^{36}$ Reiner v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo.App. 1992).
${ }^{37} Id.
{ }^{38} Section 287.200.1, RSMo.
{ }^{39} Nance v. Treasurer of Missouri, 85 S.W.3d 767 (Mo.App. W.D. 2003).
{ }^{40} Section 287.220.1, RSMo.; Brown at 482; Anderson at 576.
{ }^{41} Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Mo.App. 1992).
{ }^{42}$ Roller v. Treasurer of the State of Mo., 935 S.W.2d 739, 742-743 (Mo.App. 1996).
${ }^{43} \mathrm{Id}.
{ }^{44}$ Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 100 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. 1936); Grgic v. P \& G. Const., 904 S.W.2d 464 (Mo.App. E.D. 1995); Julian v. Consumers Markets, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 274 (Mo.App. S.D. 1994); Groce v. Pyle, 315 S.W.2d 482 (Mo.App. 1958).
${ }^{45} Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479 (Mo.App. E.D. 1990).
{ }^{46} Sprung v. Interior Const. Service, 752 S.W.2d 354 (Mo.App. E.D. 1988).
{ }^{47} Keener v. Wilcox Elec. Inc., 884 S.W.2d 744 (Mo.App. W.D. 1994).
{ }^{48}$ Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 941 S.W.2d 863 (Mo.App. S.D. 1997); Reves v. Kindell's Mercantile Co., Inc. 793 S.W.2d 917 (Mo.App. S.D. 1990). See also Kowalski v. M-G Metals and Sales, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 919 (Mo.App. S.D. 1982).
On June 4, 2012, Claimant sustained a compensable injury to his right hand. This injury occurred during the course and scope of his employment with the employer. I find that as a result of the June 2012 injury, Claimant sustained a permanent partial disability (PPD) of 30\% permanent partial disability of the right wrist/hand (at the 175 -week level).
Claimant also has several pre-existing permanent partial disabilities, as follows: 17.5\% of the left middle finger at the 35 -week level, 7.5 % of the body as a whole referable to the thoracic and lumbar spine, 3 % of the body as a whole referable to the lumbar spine (non-work injury), and 15 % of the body as a whole referable to the heart condition.
Claimant argues that he is permanently and totally disabled due to the combination of his primary (June 2012) work injury to his right wrist/hand in combination with his pre-existing conditions (which include the October 2011 work injury to his body as a whole/back, January 2012 work injury to his left middle finger at the 35 -week level; the body as a whole referable to the lumbar spine from the non-work injury, and the body as a whole referable to the heart condition). The Second Injury Fund suggests that it is liable for no benefits, or at most, is liable for permanent partial disability benefits as to the June 2012 case.
After considering all of the evidence, I find that Claimant is permanently and totally disabled and that such disability is due to the combination of his primary injury (June 2012) to his right wrist/hand and his pre-existing conditions (left middle finger at the 35 -week level, thoracic and lumbar spine, and cardiac condition). In making this determination, I find the opinions of Dr. Volarich and Mr. Dreiling to be credible and persuasive on this issue. I also specifically find that Claimant was a credible and convincing witness. Since the permanent and total disability is the result of a combination of Claimant's primary and pre-existing disabilities, the Second Injury Fund is therefore liable for payment of permanent total disability benefits.
Having established the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund for permanent total disability (PTD) exposure under this claim, there is yet the issue regarding the amount and timing of the payments under the statute. The parties agreed that Claimant reached maximum medical improvement on April 22, 2013. Claimant and the employer/insurer settled the primary injury for permanent partial disability of 30 % of the right wrist/hand, which represents 52.5 weeks of disability. Thus, the liability of the employer/insurer for permanent partial disability commences on April 23, 2013, and continues through April 26, 2014. I find the Second Injury Fund is liable for weekly PTD payments of $\ 233.23, beginning April 27, 2014, and continuing for Claimant's lifetime or until modified pursuant to statute. Since Claimant's rates for permanent partial disability and permanent total disability are the same, there is no rate differential.
Any pending objections not expressly ruled on in this Award are overruled.
This Award is subject to a lien in the amount of 25 % of the payments hereunder in favor of Evan Porter/Timothy McDuffey, McDuffey Law Firm, LLC for necessary legal services rendered to Claimant.
Made by: $\qquad$
Vicky Ruth
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation