(Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge)
Injury No. 13-016943
Employee: Alfred Savage
Employer: Kaiser Electric
Insurer: Cincinnati Casualty Company
Additional Party: Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund (Open)
This workers' compensation case is pending before the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission on employer/insurer's application for review of the administrative law judge's temporary or partial award. We have read the briefs, reviewed the evidence, and considered the whole record. We find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, ${ }^{1}$ we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge by this supplemental opinion.
We offer this supplemental opinion to add legal authority in support of the administrative law judge's conclusions.
Employee sustained a wrist injury when he fell on ice after descending steps from employer's jobsite trailer. Employer argues that employee's claim is not compensable because "employee failed to establish that the 2/28/13 incident occurred during a single work shift." We disagree. We find employee established that his work shift began before he fell. The work shifts of employee and his co-workers began no later than when they reported to the jobsite trailer and received instructions for the day's work from their foreman, Mr. Gerling.
Employer argues that even if employee's shift had begun at the time of his fall, employee removed himself from his work shift when he exited the trailer, because employee intended to go to his vehicle (parked a mere ten feet from the trailer) to retrieve something. We disagree. Employee denied he intended to go to his vehicle when he exited the trailer and we find his testimony credible.
Even assuming, as employer argues, employee intended to go to his vehicle and by intending to do so, employee removed himself from his work shift, employee's injury would still be compensable. In the 2005 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law, the legislature explicitly preserved the extension of premises doctrine as regards employee injuries sustained on property owned or controlled by employer. Inasmuch as such cases, by definition, involve injuries sustained prior or subsequent to the actual performance of job duties, the legislature clearly contemplated and accepted compensability of injuries sustained as a result of work-related risks even though employee was not at the time
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2012 (effective August 28, 2012), unless otherwise indicated.
Improvee: Alfred Savage
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engaged in the performance of job duties (e.g. going to employer's worksite or coming from employer's worksite).
Recent Missouri cases have applied the retained extension of premises doctrine and confirmed that compensation is not limited to workers injured while actively engaged in their duties. In *Scholastic, Inc. v. Viley*, the Court held that "[p]ursuant to the plain language of section 287.020.5, the extended premises doctrine is not totally eliminated but is now limited to situations where the employer owns or controls the area where the accident occurs." The existing extension of premises doctrine permits recovery of workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained by workers going to or coming from work if (a) the injury-producing accident occurs on premises which are owned or controlled by the employer, and (b) that portion of such premises is a part of the customary, expressly or impliedly approved, permitted, usual and acceptable route or means employed by workmen to get to and depart from their places of labor and is being used for such purpose at the time of the injury. Mr. Viley was awarded compensation for an injury he sustained when he fell on ice on a parking lot controlled by employer while he was walking to his car at the conclusion of his work shift.
Like Mr. Viley, the employee in the instant case fell on ice on a portion of a parking lot controlled by his employer. Employee's foreman, Mr. Gerling, testified that the day prior to employee's fall, Mr. Gerling shoveled the snow from the section of concrete upon which employee fell. Ice formed upon the section of concrete Mr. Gerling cleared. Employee fell on that ice. For purposes of our application of the extension of premises doctrine, "control," means "1. To exercise power or influence over.... 2. To regulate or govern.... 3. To have a controlling interest in." Employer, through Mr. Gerling, exercised power or influence over the section of concrete upon which employee fell when Mr. Gerling altered the condition of the concrete. Employer controlled the portion of the premises upon which employee fell. The trailer stairs and the adjacent cement to which they led are a customary and acceptable route employed by workers to depart from the jobsite trailer. If employee was going to his vehicle after exiting the trailer, as urged by employer, employee's injury occurred in the course of his employment under the retained extension of premises doctrine.
Lastly, we address employer's argument that employee was equally exposed to the hazard giving rise to his injury outside of and unrelated to his employment. Employer's argument is contrary to decided cases. As noted by the *Viley* court, "[e]ven assuming *arguendo* that [employee] was equally exposed to the hazard of slipping and falling on *an* icy parking lot in his nonemployment life, his injury still arose out of his employment because there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that he was equally exposed to the hazard of slipping on the icy parking lot at that particular work site in his nonemployment life."
We affirm the temporary or partial award. We attach the October 31, 2014, temporary or partial award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Hannelore D. Fischer, hereto and
2 452 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Mo. App. 2014).
3 Hager v. Syberg's Westport, 304 S.W.3d 771, 776 (Mo. App. 2010), citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
4 Viley, 452 S.W.3d at 687. See also, *Duever v. All Outdoors, Inc.*, 371 S.W.3d 863 (Mo. App. 2012); *Dorris v. Stoddard County*, 436 S.W.3d 586 (Mo. App. 2014).
We incorporate and adopt its findings, conclusions, award and decision herein to the extent they are not inconsistent with this award.
This award is only temporary or partial, is subject to further order and the proceedings are hereby continued and kept open until a final award can be made. All parties should be aware of the provisions of § 287.510 RSMo.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 10th day of April 2015.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman
James G. Avery, Jr., Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary