In his thorough and well-reasoned award, the administrative law judge determined that employee suffered an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. We agree, but discern a need to provide some additional findings and comments of our own. The parties dispute whether employee suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment when he stumbled and fell after squatting down to check the sound of an air compressor in the air conditioning unit of the shuttle van he was driving for employer.
Section 287.020.3(2) RSMo provides, in relevant part, as follows:
An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if ... [i]t does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
As correctly noted by the administrative law judge, the courts have interpreted the foregoing provision to involve an inquiry into whether the employee was injured because he was at work, as opposed to becoming injured merely while he was at work. Pope v. Gateway to the W. Harley Davidson, 404 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Mo. App. 2012). In finding that employee was injured because he was at work, the administrative law judge pointed to a number of factors that arguably rendered employee's work activities at the time of the accident more risky or hazardous than they might otherwise have been: employee's stepping on a pebble or his foot sticking to the pavement; the existence of cracks in the pavement repaired with tar or asphalt sealant; the hot weather that day; and the significant slope going downhill from where employee was squatting to listen to the A/C compressor.
Employer argues that the administrative law judge's identification of various factors that may have contributed to employee's fall demonstrates that the administrative law judge engaged in speculation as to the specific risk or hazard from which employee's injuries came. Noting employee's somewhat tenuous testimony that he may have stepped on a pebble or that his foot otherwise stuck to the pavement, employer cites the case of Porter v. RPCS, Inc., 402 S.W.3d 161 (Mo. App. 2013), and argues that employee has failed to identify the cause of his fall, and that his claim must be denied as a result. We are not persuaded, for the following reasons.
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ We note that the parties framed the issue as "whether the accident arose out of and in the course of [employee's] employment," Transcript, page 7 (emphasis added). Section 287.020.3(2) RSMo, however, makes clear that the relevant inquiry is whether employee sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.
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First, we note that the courts have specifically rejected the proposition that an employee is required to provide testimony identifying the specific reason for an injury-producing fall at work. "There is no requirement that [an employee] must personally identify the specific cause of her fall[.]" *Dorris v. Stoddard County*, 436 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Mo. App. 2014). Second, we note that employee agreed that the incline or slope of the parking lot in which he was performing his duties precipitated his "going backwards" upon arising from a squatting position. *Transcript*, page 210. We credit this testimony from employee, and infer therefrom as follows.
Employee's action of squatting down upon a significant incline in employer's parking lot was related to and was a direct function of his employment for employer on June 2, 2011. Employee's work activity of squatting down on a significant incline *itself* exposed him to the risk or hazard of stumbling or falling upon returning to a standing position. We find, as a factual matter, that it was the risk or hazard of squatting down on a significant incline and subsequently stumbling or falling from which employee's injuries "came"[^2] for purposes of § 287.020.3(2)(b). It is therefore unnecessary to determine what (or whether) any additional, environmental factors may have contributed in causing employee to fall.
There is no evidence on this record to suggest that employee (or workers generally)[^3] would be equally exposed to the risk or hazard of squatting down on a significant incline and subsequently stumbling or falling outside of and unrelated to employment in normal nonemployment life. This employee was nearly 68 years of age as of the date of the accident, and suffered from bilateral ankle instability. Especially in light of these facts, we deem the record sufficient to support a factual finding that employee's work exposed him to the risk or hazard of squatting down on a significant incline and subsequently stumbling or falling to a greater extent and degree than he (or workers generally) faced in normal nonemployment life. We so find. We conclude, therefore, that employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of employment.