In a workers' compensation matter, the Claimant carries the burden of proof to all material elements necessary to establish entitlement to compensation. I find that in reviewing the evidence submitted that the Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof proving an injury occurred as defined in $\S 287.020$ RSMo 2000. The question is whether he had an injury, which is a defined term in $\S 287.020$ RSMo 2000 ". 2(1) in this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course and scope of employment ...
An injury shall be deemed to arising out of and in the course of employment only if: (b) it can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work. Emphasis added.
A claimant must establish a causal connection between the accident and the compensable injury. Kerns v. Midwest Conveyor, 126 S.W.3d 445 (Mo.App. W.D. 2004). An injury will not be deemed to arise out of employment if it merely happens to occur while working. Miller v. Mo.Highway and Transportation Commission, 287 S.W.3d 671 (Mo Banc 2009). In order for Mr. Elliott to succeed on his claim as he carries the burden of proof proving each element of the claim. Lawrence v. Joplin R-8 School District, 834 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992).
Mr. Elliott failed to meet his burden of proof in this matter because the mechanism of injury in 2005 involved an episode where Mr. Elliott had taken some copper he had taken from a jobsite to scrap yards to sell for cash. The Claimant indicated in his testimony this was something he had frequently done and that with the cash he would occasionally buy his workers food or drinks. The Claimant freely admitted at the hearing this was not the type of thing that is considered part of what a stone mason does in the ordinary course and scope of their business. The Claimant, nevertheless, while at that scrap yard standing on the back of his truck when the tailgate broke and he fell into the dumpster suffering the injuries which are the underlying basis of this claim.
As a result of the Claimant's 2005 injury, Claimant currently takes four to six Oxycodone pills per day for pain and requires a duragesic pain patch. The Claimant now complains of sharp pains in his back that run down the back of his leg and that his leg has given out on multiple occasions causing him to fall, and at one point the fall caused injury to his hand. The Claimant testified he is unable to sit, stand or walk for any period of time or duration without pain. Since the 2005 injury the Claimant indicated he lies down unpredictably throughout the day for periods of one to two hours per day and that his sleep is disturbed each night because of his pain. The Claimant has not been able to work for pay since his 2005 injury but testifies he continues to fish one to two times per week and does hunt. The Claimant is able to take his boat to the lake where he loads and unloads it himself and fishes from his boat.
All of the above-mentioned conditions of ill which the Claimant has testified to is his current state of affairs were not present prior to the 2005 incident involving the surgery and fusion to his low back.
The Claimant in this matter has failed to meet his burden of proof because by his own account the salvaging of metal is not an activity that "follows as a natural incident of the work" of being a stone mason. The Claimant's case very closely resembles the case of Porter v. RPCS, Inc., 402 S.W.3d 161 (Mo.App. S.D. 2013) where the employee fell at work but was unable to show a causal connection between the accident and the work activity. It was deemed by the Court that Claimant failed to establish the necessary element that the injury arose out of and in the course and scope of employment and received no benefits. As in that case, the Claimant has failed to prove that his fall from the truck tailgate was from an activity deemed to be in the normal course and scope of employment and thus resulted in an "injury" as defined by the statutes, and therefore no Second Injury Fund liability exists.
Another issue to be considered is whether or not the Claimant would be deemed permanently and totally disabled against the Second Injury Fund even if a compensable accident were deemed to have occurred. In determining the extent of disability attributable to the Second Injury Fund, the extent of the compensable injury and compensation due from the employer must be determined first. Roller v. Treasurer, 935 S.W.2d 739 (Mo.App. 1996). If the compensable injury results in permanent total disability, no further inquiry into Second Injury Fund liability is made.
The extent of liability that the Employer has for the Claimant's 2005 injury must be assessed first prior to evaluating any potential liability of the Second Injury Fund. If that injury alone, without consideration of any pre-existing or subsequent injuries renders the Claimant permanently and totally disabled, the Employer is responsible for permanent total disability benefits to the Employee and inquiry into the liability of the Second Injury Fund is never undertaken. Roller v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 935 S.W. 2d 739 (Mo.App. 1996). Lammert v. Vess Beverages, Incorporated, 968 S.W.2d 720 (Mo.App. 1998).
The best reading of the evidence presented indicates that following the 2005 work-related injury, the Claimant suffered from such overwhelming pain and physical restrictions and limitations that he has never returned to work in the open labor market. Before his injury Claimant worked successfully full time, without restriction, without limitation to his ability to sit, stand or walk in a very heavy demand category profession. The conclusion that the Claimant is permanently and totally disabled following his 2005 work injury considered alone and in isolation is supported by the weight of the evidence in the form of the testimony of Dr. Koprivica, the vocational testimony of Ms. Titterington, and in the records of Dr. Thai. Those restrictions briefly by Ms. Titterington, Dr. Koprivica and Dr. Thai severely limit the Claimant's ability to sit, stand or walk for any period of time or duration without pain, documented sleep disturbances and significant usage of narcotic pain medication. The Claimant also testified his leg gives out due to his low back and he has to unpredictably lie down for periods of one to two hours per day each and every day. Those physical restrictions coupled with Ms. Titterington's opinion on vocational abilities permanently and totally remove the Claimant from the open labor
market based on those conditions alone. It is noted that the medical records support and the Claimant's testimony confirms that these conditions mentioned above were not present before this 2005 accident.
It is of some note, although not conclusive, to the determination of this case that the Claimant as a result of the 2005 alleged accident did pursue and receive permanent total benefits in the state of Kansas for his 2005 injury.
Wherefore, I find on the basis of the above-mentioned evidence and testimony presented that the Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof to establish an accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment and therefore is not entitled to Second Injury Fund benefits in this matter. If one were to assume for sake of argument that the Claimant had met his burden of proof that there was an accident within the course and scope of his employment, I find that the last event in 2005 alone rendered the Claimant permanently and totally disabled and that the conclusion remains the same, that there would be no Second Injury Fund liability.
Made by: $\qquad$
Mark S. Siedlik
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation