| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No. 12-093343 |
| Employee: | Carl Horton |
| Employer: | Fulton State Hospital (Settled) |
| Insurer: | C A R O (Settled) |
| Additional Party: | Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having read the briefs, reviewed the evidence, heard the parties’ arguments, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. |
| Discussion |
| Controlling case law and the 2005 amendments |
| We agree with the administrative law judge’s (implied) rejection of the Second Injury Fund’s argument in this matter that employee’s preexisting hearing loss cannot be considered a disability affecting the “body as a whole” for purposes of § 287.220.1 RSMo. As employee correctly notes in his brief, this is consistent with controlling judicial precedent on the topic. Specifically, in *Pierson v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund*, 126 S.W.3d 386 (Mo. 2004), the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected a nearly identical argument from the Second Injury Fund that vision loss could not be considered a disability affecting the body as a whole because vision loss is listed as a “member” in the “schedule of losses” set forth under § 287.190 RSMo.The Second Injury Fund acknowledges the *Pierson* decision, but asks us to assume that the holding was abrogated by the 2005 amendments to the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law, because the *Pierson* court cited the pre-2005 mandate that Chapter 287 was to be liberally construed. We are not persuaded. First, the *Pierson* court expressly relied on the fact the Second Injury Fund “offer[ed] no logical reason why the legislature would choose not to allow fund compensation for [preexisting vision or hearing deficits], but would for all others.” 126 S.W.3d at 389. It appears to us that the *Pierson* court’s decision was motivated as much (if not more so) by logic as opposed to a liberal construction of Chapter 287. Here, the Second Injury Fund fails once again to provide us with any logical reason why the legislature would intend to deny Missouri employees and their employers the benefit of protections for enhanced disability resulting from preexisting hearing loss, but would for all other preexisting disabilities. The fact that occupational hearing loss enjoys its own statutory and regulatory provisions does nothing to |
Improvee: Carl Horton
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demonstrate any legislative intent to preclude Second Injury Fund liability in cases involving preexisting hearing loss, or to justify such a patently "illogical" result.
Second, we note that the legislature expressly abrogated a number of judicial decisions and judicial interpretations of key terms in 2005. See, e.g., § 287.020.10 RSMo. We note also that the legislature left the material provisions of §§ 287.190 and 287.220.1 undisturbed. Accordingly, to accept the Second Injury Fund's argument in this matter, we would need to assume that, rather than list the *Pierson* decision as among those abrogated in 2005, the legislature intended to silently abrogate *Pierson* and introduce a new, unstated definition of "body as a whole" by means of replacing the liberal construction mandate of § 287.800 RSMo for the new requirement thereunder that the language of Chapter 287 be strictly construed. In asking us to make these assumptions, the Second Injury Fund argument distorts the meaning of strict construction:
[A] strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed. The rule of strict construction does not mean that the statute shall be construed in a narrow or stingy manner, but it means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the language used. Moreover, a strict construction confines the operation of the statute to matters affirmatively pointed out by its terms, and to cases which fall fairly within its letter. The clear, plain, obvious, or natural import of the language should be used, and the statutes should not be applied to situations or parties not fairly or clearly within its provisions.
*Allcorn v. Tap Enters.*, 277 S.W.3d 823, 828 (Mo. App. 2009) (citations omitted).
To assume the legislature's 2005 amendments to Chapter 287 silently abrogated *Pierson* in favor of the "illogical" exclusion of Second Injury Fund liability in cases of preexisting hearing loss would, in our view, run directly contrary to the mandate of strict construction, because it would require us to presume something that is not expressed by those amendments. It would also require us to presume a definition of "body as a whole" that is not affirmatively pointed out by the terms of either §§ 287.190 or 287.220.1. Applying the clear, plain, obvious, or natural import of the phrase "body as whole," as well as the controlling precedent from *Pierson*, we conclude that this employee's preexisting hearing loss amounted to a preexisting disability affecting his body as a whole. For these reasons, we affirm the award of compensation.
**Conclusion**
We affirm and adopt the award of the administrative law judge as supplemented herein.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge David L. Zerrer, issued May 14, 2015, is attached and incorporated herein to the extent not inconsistent with this supplemental decision.
We approve and affirm the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.
AnX past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $6^{\text {th }}$ day of November 2015.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman
James G. Avery, Jr., Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary