Christine Ann Lollar, Appellant, vs. Richard Dwain Lollar, Respondent.

CHRISTIN E ANN LO LLAR, ) ) Ap p e lla nt, ) ) v. ) No. SC97984 ) RICHARD DWAIN LO LLAR, ) ) Respondent. ) AP PEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY The Honorable Thea Ann Sherry, Judge C h ristine Ann (Lawson) Lo lla r ("W ife " ) appeals from the circuit court's judgme n t dissolving her marriage to Ric ha rd Dwa in Lo lla r ("Hus b a nd ") and distrib ut i ng the mar it a l estate. Wife claims the circuit court erred in awarding a marital 401(k) account of uncer t a i n value to Husband due to Husband's ma rita l mis c o nd uc t. This C ourt granted transfer aft e r opinion by the court of appeals. 1 The c irc uit court's judgment is affirmed. Back ground

Wife and Husband married in 2005. They separated December 9, 2015, after Wife reported Husband to law enforcement for sexually assault ing their daughter. Husband was 1 This C ourt has jurisdiction under article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. Opinion issued September 1, 2020

2 arrested and charged with f irs t-degree statutory rape, firs t-degree statutory sodomy, and firs t-degree c hild mo le s ta t io n. After his arrest, Wife petitioned for dissolution of marria ge. Durin g the d is s o lut io n tria l, Wife testified that, while Husband was detaine d fo llo w i n g his a rre s t, she lost her job and had no source of income. She testified she used Husband's fina l paychecks and a tax refund to pay outstanding debts and b ills . S he surrendered a Ford Mustang previous l y driven by Husband to creditors because she could not afford payme nt s on the lo a n. To reduce expenses, Wife moved to a s ma lle r re s id e n c e. The new residence could not accommodate all the possessions from the larger home, so she disposed of some personal property, including some of Husband's personal possessions. The ma rita l e s ta te included a 401(k) account in Husband's name. During the tria l, neither Wife nor Husband provided specific evidence as to the account's actual value. Wife s a id the 401(k) account was valued at "[a] couple thousand, perhaps" but "less than five " thousand d o lla rs. Husband te s tifie d the amount in the account was "only like a couple thousand dollars." After weighi ng the inexact evidence, the circuit court determined the value of the account to be "less than $5,000.00." Wife did not seek an award of child support or maintenance due to Husband's incarceration, but she sought a disproportionate value of the marital estate, inc lud i n g 100 percent o f the 401(k). Wife justified this request because she was the sole provider for their daughter, her monthly income did not cover her reasonable needs, and Husband had c o mmitte d mis c o nd u c t during the marria ge by assaulting their daughter. Husband, representing himself, presented no evidence but requested an even divis io n of the 401(k).

3 Husband explained he n eeded funds fro m the account to pay the marita l debts Wife sought to assign to him because his incarceration prevented him from earning income. After weighing the evidence, including W ife's and Husband's property stateme n ts lis tin g the separate ma rita l p ro p e rty and debts with corresponding and disputed values, the circuit court divided the marital estate. The circuit court awarded W ife a vehicle valued at $17,000 2 —the most substantia l asset of the marital property—and all personal property in her possession. The circuit court also assigned less than half of the marital debts to Wife, inc lu d in g several credit cards in her name and half of the daughter' s outstand ing med ic a l expenses. The marita l debt the circuit court assigned to Wife totaled $11,000. On balance, the total value of Wife's allocation of marital property was $6,000. The circuit court assigned a higher percentage of the marital debts to Husband, includ ing the other ha lf o f the daughter's outstanding me d ic a l expenses and several other credit cards. The marita l debts allocated to Husband totaled $12,800. The c irc uit court awarded Husband the ent ir e 401(k) account, but Husband received no other assets of significa nt value. The total ne t value of Husband's allocation of the marital property was approximately $7,800 of debt, assuming the 401(k) had a value of $4,999.99. 3 In its judgme nt, the circuit court also found Wife dissipated marital assets by using Husband's paychecks and the tax refund to pay 2 In an amended property statement, Wife listed a debt of $18,000 encumbering the vehicle. While acknowledging the $18,000 debt in the final judgment, the circuit court ultimate l y found the net equity value of the vehicle to be $17,000. Wife does not challenge this finding on appeal. 3 The circuit court did not find the 401(k) account was worth $4,999.99. Rather, the circuit court found the account was worth "less than $5,000." Of course, Husband's allocation of the net debt would increase with a decrease in the value. By assuming the full value of the 401(k) found by the circuit court, Husband's net allocation was $7,800 of debt.

4 outstand ing de bts a nd utilit y b ills . Despite this find ing, the circuit court's apportionme nt of the marital estate favored Wife. On appeal, W ife c la ims the circuit court legally erred and abused its d is c re tio n in awarding the entire 401(k) account to Husband in ligh t o f Husband's mis c o nd u c t. Specifically, Wife argues the court erred in failing to appropriately distribute the marita l estate based on its finding that she dissipated marital assets by paying debts and househo ld b ills with Husband's paychecks and the tax refund. 4

Standard of Review The judgme nt in a court-tried civil case will b e s us ta ine d "unless there is no substant ia l evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it 4 Wife's sole point relied on does not comply with Rule 84.04(d) in that it raises mult ip le c la ims o f e rro r: 1) the circuit court abused its discretion by allocating the 401(k) account to Husband; 2) the circuit court's judgme nt was not supported by substantia l evidence; and 3)the circuit court erred in find ing the dissipatio n of assets. These claims are separate and distinct inquiries and require discrete legal analyses. See Macke v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865, 869-70 (Mo. banc 2019). A multifarious point preserves nothing for appellate review. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 615 n.9 (Mo. banc 2018). An appellant bears the burden to overcome many presumptions on appeal, including the presumption that the circuit court's judgme nt is correct. Bramer v. Abston, 553 S.W.3d 872, 879 (Mo. App. 2018). "To satisfy this burden, and overcome the judicial preference for 'fina lit y of judgme nts,' an appellant must co mp ly with the rules of appellate procedure." Id. Co mp lia n c e with appellate briefing rules is necessary to ensure appellate courts do not take on an advocacy role by easing the burd e n on the appellant and speculating about facts or arguments that may overcome the presumpt io n that the judgme nt is correct. Myrick v. E. Broad., Inc., 970 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Mo. App. 1998) (c itin g Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Mo. banc 1978)). However, this C ourt may conduct review, ex gratia, of such points on the mer it s . Id. Ultima te ly, W ife 's right to re lie f depends on whether the circuit court abused its d is c re tio n in d is trib u t ing the marital assets and debts resulting in prejudice to Wife regardless o f whether the circuit court erred finding she dissipated assets. Therefore, this Court exercises its discretion to review this c la im o f e rro r.

5 erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976) (setting the standard of review for court-tried c ivil cases). Only errors "materially affecting the merits of the action," or prejudic ia l errors, require reversal. Rule 84.13(b); § 512.160.2. 5 "The trial court has broad discretion in identifying, valuing, and dividing marital property." Landewee v. Landewee, 515 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotation omitted). In addition, appellate courts will "inte r fe re [in ma rita l p ro p e rty d ivis io n s ] o nly whe re the d ivis io n is so unduly favorable to one party that it constitutes an abuse of discretion." Stone v. Stone, 450 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Mo. App. 2014). This C ourt presumes the property division was correct, and the appella n t bears the burden of overcoming the presumption. Id. In review ing the circuit court's judgme nt, this C ourt accepts as true the facts and a ll reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgme nt . Rule 73.01(a)(2); Landewee, 515 S.W.3d at 691. This C ourt disregards all evidence and infere nce s to the contrary. In re Marriage of Hillis, 313 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Mo. banc 2010). This Court does not review credibility determinatio ns o r re s o lut io ns of conflict i ng evidence. In re Marriage of Patroske, 888 S.W.2d 374, 383 (Mo. App. 1994). Div ision of Marital Assets "While the trial court's division of marital property need not be equal, it must be fa ir" under the facts and circumstances of the case. Silcox v. Silcox, 6 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Mo. banc 1999). "Retirement benefits are considered marital property and are subject to 5 All statutory citations are to RSMo 2016.

6 division, unless they were accumulated prior to the marriage." Rallo v . Rallo, 477 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Mo. App. 2015). The parties bear the burden to present evidence of the value of marital property. Cosby v. Cosby, 291 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo. App. 2009). A circuit court may rely on a party's estimate of an asset's value, but the court is not required to find the value in accordance with that estimate. See In re marriage of Kovach, 873 S.W.2d 604, 608-609 (Mo. App. 1993). If the parties do not present cre d ib le evidence of the value of marita l property, the circuit court cannot be found to have distributed the property unequall y. In re Marriage of Julian, 868 S.W.2d 182, 186-87 (Mo. App. 1994). After the circuit court determines the value of the marital property, the cour t distrib ute s the property between the parties by we ighing the non-exclusive factors outlined in section 452.330.1. Section 452.330.1 provides the circuit court "shall divide the marita l property and marital debts in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors," but the court must consider certain factors. 6 Ma rita l mis c o nd uc t is a factor listed in section 452.330.1; however, it is just one of many factors the c irc uit cour t mus t c o ns id e r when divid ing ma rita l p ro p e rty. Other factors may balance or even outweigh 6 These factors are: the economic circumstances of the parties; the contribution of each party to the acquisit io n of the property, includ ing the contributio n o f a spouse as homemaker; the value of nonmarital property set aside to each party; the conduct of the parties during the marriage; and the custodial arrange me nt s for the minor c hild re n.

7 the e ffe c t o f ma rita l mis c o nd uc t a nd give ris e to ma rita l p ro p e rty d ivis io n tha t fa vo rs o ne spouse. 7

On appeal, Wife c la ims the circuit court abused its discretion by unduly favo r i n g Husband in apportioning the ma rita l p ro p e rty and bears the burden of showing an abuse o f d is c re tio n. Silcox, 6 S.W.3d at 904-05. W ife cannot meet this burden and show the cir c ui t court abused its discretion in d is trib u t ing the ma rita l assets and debts. This Court looks at a ll fa c ts in the ligh t mo s t fa vo ra b le to the jud gme nt and disregards evidence to the contrary. Rule 73.01(c) ; Hillis, 313 S.W.3d at 644. Review ing the circuit court's judgment und e r this standard of review, the circuit court's asset and debt division is not so disproportio na te in Husband's fa vo r as to constitute an abuse of discretion. In fact, the d ivis io n o f a s s e t s and debts disproportiona te ly fa vo rs W ife. As described above, Wife received a vas t amount o f ma rita l assets totaling $17,000. The only asset apportioned to Husband was the 401(k) account valued at less than $5,000, and he received a larger portion of the marita l debts. W hile Murphy v. Carron dictates this Court review the circuit court's judgme nt to d e te rmine if it "erroneously declares the law . . . [or] erroneously applies the law," 536 S.W.2d at 32, erroneous declaration or application of the law is not itself sufficient to justify reversal. This C o urt will find re ve rs ib le e rro r only when it materially affects the merits of the action with a "firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong." Id.; see also Rule 7 Additionally, "[e]ven if the [c irc uit] c o urt b e lieve s the evidence of miscond uc t, it can still divide the property in equal fashio n. " Seggelke v. Seggelke, 319 S.W.3d 461, 466 (Mo. App. 2010).

8 84.13(d). In other words, a party must not only demonstrate error but also show prejud ic e . Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 109-10 (Mo. banc 2007). Because Wife received a disproportionately advantageous division of the marital estate, Wife was not prejudiced by the circuit court's finding that she dissipated marital assets, even assuming this find ing was in error. See Knapp v. Knapp, 874 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. App. 1994) (finding that, despite erroneous application of the law, there was no prejudice to one spouse when the net effect of the asset division favored that spouse). The dissentin g opinio n contends the d is s ip a t io n find ing was error warrantin g reversal of the circuit court's judgme nt. But even if the circuit court's dissipation find ing erroneously applied the law, Wife received a vastly disproportionate amount of the marita l estate and cannot show she was prejudiced by the circuit court's distributio n. Without a showing of prejudice, even an erroneous application of law is insufficient for reversal under Murphy v. Carron. In fact, had the circuit court awarded the 401(k) account to Wife, the circuit court would have awarded all the marital assets to W ife, le a vin g Husband with a disproportionate amount of the marital debt and no assets from which to pay these debts. S uc h a d ivis io n could arguably constit ut e an abuse o f the circuit court's d is c re tio n. See Hight v. Hight, 314 S.W.3d 874, 879-880 (Mo. App. 2010) (finding an abuse of discretio n in a wa rd in g wife 9 3 percent of marital assets and o nly 27 percent of marital debt despite husband's abuse during the marria ge ); see also Bohon v. Bohon, 102 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Mo. App. 2003) (stating anything exceeding a 60/40 division may constitute abuse of discretio n

9 without justificatio n) (citing I n re Marriage of Woodson, 92 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Mo. banc 2003)). 8 Moreover, the circuit court was tasked with divid ing marita l property without the benefit of complete information about the disputed property's financial worth. Husband and Wife shared the burden of proving the value of the account, Cosby, 291 S.W.3d at 799, but neither party provided fixed evidence of its value. Wife valued the account between $2,000 and $5,000. Husband valued the account at approximately $2,000. Wife insists the parties' statements as to the value of the account constitute evidence to determine the va lue of the account. See Kovach, 873 S.W.2d at 608-09. W hile this is true, the partie s ' estimated values contained in their property statements for the 401(k) account only suppo r t the circuit court's find in g: the imprecise value of "less than $5,000." And while thes e estimates provide evidence of the account's value, the c irc uit court is not required to find the value in accordance with that estimate. Id. at 609. In this case, the circuit court found the asset had no clear value. Given the circuit court's credibility findings and ove ra ll d istribution of property and debts, this Court cannot say an alleged erroneous statement or 8 To be sure, Missouri appellate courts ro utine ly a ffir m disproportionate distributions of marital property. See, e.g., Woodson, 92 S.W.3d at 785; L.R.S. v. C.A.S., 525 S.W.3d 172, 186-87 (Mo. App. 2017); Rombach v. Rombach, 867 S.W.2d 500, 505 (Mo. banc 1993) (find ing no abuse of discretio n when the circuit court awarded the wife approximately 78 percent of net marital property); see also, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 25 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. App. 2000); Jennings v. Jennings, 910 S.W.2d 760, 765-67 (Mo. App.1995) (a ffir m in g th e award of 86 percent of marital property to one spouse); Foraker v. Foraker, 133 S.W.3d 84 (Mo. App 2004) (affirming the award of 90 percent of the marital estate to one spouse after accounting for all marital assets, marital debts, and money judgme nt s). Howeve r , none of these examples includes allocating all marital assets to one spouse while a ls o allocating a disproportionate amount of the marital debt to the other spouse.

10 application of law prejudiced Wife or that t he circuit court abused its discretion or lacked substant ia l evidence in awarding the 401(k) account to Husband when the account has no clear value. Wife bears the burden to show the asset and debt divis io n was unduly favorable to Husband, and she has not shown the asset and debt divis io n is unfair under the circumstances or that the circuit court committed reversible error. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the c irc uit court's judgme nt, the court acted within its d is c re tio n in a wa rd in g the 401(k) account to Husband.

Conclus ion The circuit court's jud gme nt is a ffir me d . ____________________ W. Brent Powell, Judge Wilson and Russell, JJ., concur; Fischer, J., concurs in separate opinion filed; Breckenridge, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Draper, C.J., and Stith, J., concur in opinion of Breckenridge, J.

CHRISTIN E ANN LO LLAR, ) ) Ap p e lla nt, ) ) v. ) No. SC97984 ) RICHARD DWAIN LO LLAR, ) ) Respondent. )

In my view, this C ourt should d is mis s Wife's appeal because her sole point relied on fa ils to c o mp ly with Rule 84.04. Nevertheless, the principal opinion has chosen to review an argume nt ex gratia. Because I agree with the principal o p inio n, I concur. Rule 84.04's briefing requirements are mandatory. Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Mo. banc 2005). Rule 84.04(d)(1) requires a point relied on to identify a single claim of reversib le error, to concisely state the legal reasons for that claim of error, and to explain ho w those legal reasons, in the context of the case at hand, support the stated c la im o f e rro r. 1 A point relied on is "multifario us" in violation of Rule 84.04—and preserves nothing fo r appellate review—w he n it conta ins multip le , ind e p e nd e nt c la ims . Macke v. Patton, 591 1 Complying with Rule 84.04(d) is not complicated, as the Rule provides the following template: "The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error] . " Rule 84.04(d)(1) (italics in or igina l) .

2 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. banc 2019). Put another way, "[a] point relied on violates Rule 84.04(d) when it groups together multiple contentions not related to a single issue and is subject to dismissal." Mo. Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Louis Cty., 448 S.W.3d 267, 271 n.5 (Mo. banc 2014) (emphasis added). Wife's sole p o int re lie d o n is a s fo llo ws : The Circuit Court e rre d in de nying Wife any part of a marital retireme nt account be caus e the trial court's ruling was an abus e of dis cre tion and was not s upporte d by s ubs tantial e vide nce to jus tify de priving Wife of an equitable share of the marital asset in that the Court erred as a matter of fact and law in failing to apply the relevant statutory factors in an appropriate manner thereby depriving Wife of any portion of the account whe n he r payme nt of ordinary hous e hold bills was e rrone ous ly found to be the dissipation of marital assets. Wife ' s p o int re lie d on asserts the circuit court abused its discretion in its distrib utio n of marita l assets and debts, that the circuit court's judgment was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the circuit court misapp lie d the law in rendering its judgme nt. Because these challenges are distinct claims that must be raised in separate points relied on, Wife's point is mult ifa r io us, preserves nothing for this Court's review, and should be dismissed. Mack e, 591 S.W.3d at 869-70; Mo. Bankers Ass'n, 448 S.W.3d. at 271 n.5; see also J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 630 n.10 (Mo. banc 2014). The principa l opinion recognizes this but nonethe les s addresses the point relied on ex gratia. Slip op. at 4-5 n.4. W hile I acknowledge this C o urt' s d is c re tio n to address noncomp lia nt points ex gratia, Mack e, 591 S.W.3d at 870, this discretio n should only be exercised in rare cases because it necessarily puts this Court in an advocacy position. See

3 Thummel v. King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. banc 1978) 2 ; see also Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 619 (Mo. banc 2018) (Fischer, J., dissenting). In addition, this Court should e mp lo y ex gratia review only when the issue contained in the point relied on is exceedingl y important. See Macke, 591 S.W.3d at 870 n.3 (employing ex gratia review of a noncomplia nt point relied on because the court of appeals repeatedly misapplied the correct standard of appellate review for wrongful death settlement apportionme nt determinatio ns); see also Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 907 n.10 (Mo. banc 2019) ("[Th is ] C ourt should exerc is e extreme caution when deciding whether to conduct discretionary ex gratia review, as such review is warranted only where necessary to avoid manifest injustice."). 2 The problems with an appellate court assuming an advocacy role were more fully explaine d in Th u mme l: The requirement that the point relied on clearly state the contention on appeal is not simply a judicial word game or a matter of hypertechnicality on the part of appellat e courts. It is rooted in sound policy . . . If the appellate court is left to search the argument portion of the brief (or even worse, to search the record on appeal) to determine and clarify the nature of the contentions asserted, much more is at stake than a waste of judicial time (even though in this time of increased litigation and heavy caseloads, that alone is sufficient justification for the rules). The more invidious problem is that the court may interpret the thrust of the contention differently than does the opponent or differently than was intended by the party asserting the contention. If that happens, the appellate process has failed in its primary objective of resolving issues raised and relied on in an appeal. .... It is not the function of the appellate court to serve as advocate for any party to an appeal. That is the function of counsel. It would be unfair to the parties if it were otherwise. That is the reason for the sometimes expressed unwillingness of an appellate court to assume the role of counsel and advocate for a party on appeal. When counsel fail in their duty by filing briefs which are not in conformity with the applicable rules and do not sufficiently advise the court of the contentions asserted and the merit thereof, the court is left with the dilemma of deciding that case (and possibly establishing precedent for future cases) on the basis of inadequate briefing and advocacy or undertaking additional research and briefing to supply the deficiency. Courts should not be asked or expected to assume such a role. In addition to being inherently unfair to the other party to the appeal, it is unfair to parties in other cases awaiting disposition because it takes from them appellate time and resources whic h should be devoted to expeditious resolution of their appeals. 570 S.W.2d at 678 (emphasis added).

4 The instant case does not contain an exceedingly important issue, as it merely asks this C ourt to review the circuit court's judgme nt under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976), which applies to every bench-tried case. Because an exceedingly important issue is not present here, this C ourt should fo llo w its Rule s a s writte n a nd d is mis s Wife's appeal. Rule 84.13(a) ("[A]llegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal[.]"). 3

__________________________

Zel M. Fischer, Judge 3 Wif e ' s point relied on before the court of appeals was as follows: The Circuit Court e rre d in de nying Wife any s hare of Hus band's re tire ment account be caus e it was an abus e of dis cre tion and not s upporte d by s ubs tantial e vide nce to de prive Wife of an e quitable s hare of the marital as s e t in that the Court e rre d in finding that Wife had dis s ipate d marital as s e ts by paying marital bills . This multifarious point relied on should not have been addressed by the court of appeals because it violates Rule 84.04. Apart from being defective under Rule 84.04, Wife's point relied on in her substitute brief before this Court violates Rule 83.08(b). Rule 83.08(b) provides "[a] party may file a substitute brief in this Court. The substitute brief shall conform with Rule 84.04, shall include all claims the party desires this Court to review [and] shall not alter the basis of any claim that was raised in the court of appeals brief[.]" (Emphasis added). Wife's point relied on before the court of appeals alleged the circuit court abused its discretion and that its judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. It did not allege the circuit court misapplied the law in rendering its decision, which is the sole basis of the dissenting opinion. By relying on the unpreserved claim as the basis of its analysis, the dissenting opinion wrongfully equates a substantial evidence claim and/or an abuse of discretion claim w ith a misapplication of the law c la im. These are distinct claims that must be raised in separate points relied on. See supra slip op. at 2 (Fischer, J., concurring). In addition, this Court previously has rejected the dissenting opinion's suggestion that an appellate court may consult the argument section of an appellant's brief to decipher what issues were or were not r a is e d in the point relied on. See Storey, 175 S.W.3d at 126 (quoting State v. Dodd, 10 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Mo. App. 1999) ("A point relied on written contrary to the mandatory requirement s of Rule 84.04(d), which cannot be comprehended without resorting to other portions of the brief , preserves nothing for appellate review."). In my view, the dissenting opinion has necessarily taken an advocacy position by choosing to review a misapplicat ion of the law claim that was not proper ly presented to this Court or the court of appeals.

1

CHRISTIN E ANN LO LLAR, ) ) Ap p e lla nt, ) ) v. ) No. SC97984 ) RICHARD DWAIN LO LLAR, ) ) Respondent. ) D ISSENTING OPINION

judgment should be affirmed depend on a misapplication of this Court's standard for prejudic ia l error. It holds, contrary to precedent, that C hris tine Lo lla r ("W ife") was no t prejudiced by the circuit court's mis a p p lic a t io n o f the la w and consequential abuse of d is c re tio n, even though she received less than all relief requested and the error affected the re sult, because Wife ultimate ly received an advantageo us d ivis io n o f the marital estate. Wife c la ims tha t, in d ivid in g the ma rita l p ro p e rty inc lud i n g Ric ha rd Lo lla r ' s (" Husband") re tire me n t account, the circuit court abused its discretion when it mis a p p l i ed the law and held she d is s ip a te d ma rita l fund s by us ing Husband's la s t paychecks and a ta x re fund to pay marital debt, b ills, and utilitie s. Analys is of this c la im s ho ws the circuit court abused its discretion as the result of an erroneous applic a t io n o f la w and its error affec te d

2 the outcome of the case.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the circuit court's divis io n of the marital property and remand the case. Factual Background The parties separated December 9, 2015, after Wife learned Husband was sexually abusing their daughter and contacted law enforcement. Husband was charged with the felonies of statutory rape in the first degree, statutory sodomy in the first degree, and child molestation in the first degree. Thereafter, W ife file d a p e titio n fo r d is s o lu t io n of the ir ma rria ge. At trial, Wife was represented, Husband appeared pro se, and a guardian ad litem represented the interests of their daughter. Wife was the only witness. The circuit court took judicial notice of the records of Husband's criminal case, the adult protection and child protection actions filed by Wife, and the juvenile proceeding regarding the parties' daughter. The circuit court also took judicial notice of the dissolution case file, which included Husband's ve rifie d me mo ra nd u m and statement o f property, Wife's verif i e d amended statement of property, and a stipulation of the parties. While Husband had not been convicted at the time of trial, 1 for purposes of adjudicating child custody and visitation, the judgment incorporated the findings in W ife ' s adult protection and child protection actions and the juvenile case involving the parties' 1 W hile this case was pending on appeal, Husband pleaded guilty to statutory sodomy in the first degree and statutory rape in the first degree and was sentenced to ten and eight years in prison, respectively. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The charge of felony child molestation in the first degree was nolle prossed.

3 daughter. Although not articula ted in the dissolut io n judgme nt, the find ings in those cases were that Husband had sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse with the partie s ' daughter. 2 The findin gs in the other cases were referenced four times and were the basis of the circuit court's rulings that "the child has diffic ult y in her interact io ns and inte rre la t io n s h ip s with Hus b a nd," "frequent and meaningful contact between the child and Husband would be detrimental to the child's welfare," and that Wife should be awarded sole physical and legal custody with no visitat io n awarded to Husband. The o nly liq u id a s s e t to be divided between the parties was Husband's 401(k) account. Both Husband's and Wife's property statements list the value of Husba nd ' s 401(k) account as $2,000 or less. At trial, Wife testifie d that the value of the 401(k) account was less than $5,000, the value found by the circuit court. Wife's proposed property d ivis io n re q ue s te d that 100 percent o f the 401(k) account be awarded to her, but Husb a nd asked the court to divide the account evenly between them. Wife also testified at trial that she has a net income of $1,833 per month from her employment as an administrative assistant and expenses of $2,341. In response to cross- examina t io n by Husband, Wife testifie d she us ed his last paychecks to pay monthly ma inte n a nc e , b ills Husband had not paid at the time he was incarcerated, and personal property taxes on both cars. She explained the monthly "ma int e nance" she paid was 2 The commissioner who presided over the dissolution proceedings and made find ings and recommendations that were adopted by a circuit judge was the same commissioner who presided over the juvenile proceeding and made findings and recommendations that were adopted by a different circuit judge in that case.

4 utilit ie s and househo ld expenses. She further t estified she used the refund from her tax returns 3 to pay debt. In its judgment, the circuit court found W ife d is s ip a te d ma rita l fund s by using Husband's last three paychecks in the amount of $4,836 and tax refunds to pay off her credit cards, b ills , and utilitie s. It then expressly relied on that finding to award Husb a nd the entire 401(k) account. The circuit court stated: In arriving at the division of marital property, . . . the C ourt has not inte nd e d to set off the marital property into approximately equal shares, consider ing the nature of the assets of the parties, and Wife [sic] dissipation of martia l [sic] assets as she testified she used Husband's last paychecks and tax returns [sic] to pay off her credit card debt and bills and utilities. Wife also testifie d she discarded Husband's personal property due to the fact she had to vacate the residence as requested by the landlord, and testified that some of the items were Husband's separate property. The c irc uit court referenced the fact W ife us ed Husband's last three paychecks and tax refunds seven additional time s in the judgme nt and, at one point, this fact was recited in three consecutive paragraphs. The circuit court also stated, generally, that it had considered the conduct of the parties during the marria ge, but there was no express reference to Husband's sexual crimes against the child in the division of property portion of the judgme nt. Standard of Review A c irc uit c o urt "ha s d is c re tio n in d ivid in g ma rital property, unless the divis io n vio la te s Murphy v. Carron, or is so one-sided as to be an abuse of discretion." In re 3 W ife filed income tax returns in 2015 and 2016 under a married, filing separately, status. She testified she received refunds and used them to pay debts. There is no evidence in the record as to the amount of her tax refunds.

5 Marriage of Woodson, 92 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Mo. banc 2003). A circuit court's judgme n t should be reversed if there is no substant ia l evidence to support it, it is against the we ight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law, Murphy v.Carron, 536 S.W.2d at 32, and the error affects the result or outcome of the case, Lozano v.BNSF Ry. Co., 421 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Mo. banc 2014). Analys is 4

4 The concurring opinion would have this appeal dismissed for failure to comply with the b rie fin g re q uire me n ts in Rule 84.04. While the concurring opinion cites cases noting the Court's rules for appellate briefs, the cited cases follow this Court's longsta nd ing po lic y to, "when possible, . . . decide a case on its merits rather than on technical deficiencies in the brief." Mo. Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Louis Cty., 448 S.W.3d 267, 271 n.5 (Mo. banc 2014); see also Macke v. Patton, 591 S.W.3d 865, 869-70 (Mo. banc 2019); Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 615 n.9 (Mo. banc 2018); Alpert v. State, 543 S.W.3d 589, 592 n.4 (Mo. banc 2018); Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 268 n.8 (Mo. banc 2016); Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 126-58 (Mo. banc 2005); J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W .2d 336, 338 (Mo. banc1998); Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 1997); Thummel v . King, 570 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Mo. banc 1978). W ife 's p o int re lie d o n is mult ifa r io us , b u t it does not impede review on the merits. It gives sufficient notice of the issues presented o n a p p e a l. The p rinc ip a l o p inio n fo llo ws this C o urt's p o lic y in d e c id in g the c a s e o n it s me rits . The concurring opinion further asserts Wife did not raise the claim the circuit court misapplied the law in her brief in the court of appeals; rather, she raised only the errors tha t the circuit court abused its discretion and its judgment was not supported by substant ia l evidence. The concurring opinion is correct that Rule 83.08(b) does not permit a party to alter, in its s ub s titu te b rie f, the b a s is o f a ny c la im ra is e d in its b rie f file d in the c o urt o f appeals. An abuse of discretion necessarily occurs, however, when the circuit court mis a p p lie s the la w. See Curtis v. Mo. Democratic Party, 548 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Mo. banc 2018); U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs. v. Boresi, 396 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Mo. banc 2013); State ex rel. City of Jennings v. Riley, 236 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Mo. banc 2007); Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 715, 720 (Mo. banc 2007); S.M.S. v. J.B.S., 588 S.W.3d 473, 493 (Mo. App. 2019); Elsea v. U.S. Eng'g Co., 463 S.W.3d 409, 416 (Mo. App. 2015); Fritzche v. E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, 405 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. App. 1966); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); Raymond v. United States, 933 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2019).

6 The circuit court found Wife dissipated m arita l assets by using "Husband 's la s t paychecks and tax returns [sic] to pay off her credit card debt and bills and utilities. " A spouse dissipates marital assets when the spouse squanders or conceals marital property in anticipation of divorce. Loomis v. Loomis, 158 S.W.3d 787, 791 (Mo. App. 2005). If a s p o us e d is s ip a te s ma rita l property, the circuit court may hold the dissipating spouse liable for the value of the marita l assets that no longer exist, Kester v. Kester, 108 S.W.3d 213, 222 (Mo. App. 2003), or consider the dissipation of funds as a factor in dividing the re ma in i n g ma rita l p ro p e rty, Murray v. Murray, 853 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Mo. App. 1993). A spouse does not squander marital property, however, by merely expending mar it a l funds after separation and before dissolution. Marital funds used to pay justified or legitimate expenditures are not squandered. See Neal v. Neal, 281 S.W.3d 330, 342 (Mo. App. 2009); Kester, 108 S.W.3d at 222. In particular, marital funds used to pay marita l debts or ordinary living expenses are not considered dissipated. In re Marriage of Rogers, 300 S.W.3d 567, 578 (Mo. App. 2009); accord Dowell v . Dowell, 203 S.W.3d 271, 280 (Mo. App. 2006). Therefore, whether Wife's credit card debt was marital or nonmar ita l In her point relied on in the court of appeals, Wife asserted the circuit court abused its discretio n in denying her a portion of Husband's 401(k) account "in that the C ourt erred in finding that Wife had d is s ip a te d ma rita l a s s e ts b y p a ying ma rita l b ills . " In s up p o rt o f this claim of error, Wife stated in the argument portion of her brief, "The property divis io n order granting Husband 100 percent of the 401(k) account was not supported by the substant ia l evidence and was erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court entered the disproportionate order on the ground that Wife had committed marital misconduct by d is s ip a t in g the ma rita l a s s e ts ." Accordingly, Wife's claim in the court of appeals is substant ially the same as the claim raised here.

7 determines whether she dissipated marital funds when she used Husband's last paychecks a nd tax refunds to pay off her credit cards. At tria l, the spouse asserting a marital asset was squandered bears the burden o f producing evidence to demonstrate the asset was squandered. Rallo v . Rallo, 477 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Mo. App. 2015). F ro m the record, however, Husband never asserted Wife d is s ip a te d ma rita l fund s, and he did not present evidence of dissipation or offer any evidence refuting Wife's testimony that she used his paychecks and tax refunds to pay living expenses and personal property taxes owed on their vehicles. 5 In fact, in a me mo ra nd u m file d with the c irc uit court, he affirma tive ly stated he had no informa t io n regarding the disposition of his paychecks. Because Husband made no effort to claim Wife d is s ip a te d ma rita l fund s a nd presented no evidence to that effect, it appears the circuit court raised the issue sua sponte. The evidence was Wife used Husband's last paychecks to pay the parties' personal property taxes, 6 bills Husband left behind when he went to jail, utilit y bills, and househo ld expenses. There was also evidence that she used tax refunds from her returns to pay debt. The only evidence of debt Wife paid was a Target credit card of $400 and Walmart card of $500 that were both in her name, monthly payment s on the parties' loan on their C he vy Cruze, and the parties' personal property taxes. 5 Of course, the circuit court is entitled to believe all, part, or none of Wife's te s timo n y , Q.A.H. v. M.H., 426 S.W.3d 7, 13 (Mo. banc 2014), but without Wife's testimo n y, there is no evidence of the disposition of Husband's paychecks or the income tax refund. 6 Evidence was adduced that the parties owed $600 in personal property taxes on the ma rit a l ve hic le s .

8 Throughout the judgment, the circuit court characterized the Wife's credit card debt a s marita l debt. The judgme nt notes Wife identified "marital debt of $18,000 to GM Finance for the Chevy Cruise [sic], Walmart credit card, and Target credit card" and Husband listed the Target credit card as marital debt in his statement of property. The judgment then purports to divide the parties' "marital property" and therein awards the Target and Walmart credit card debt to Wife. The judgme nt shows the circuit court found Wife's credit card debt to be marital debt. Therefore, the circuit court abused its discretio n when it misapplied the law in holding Wife dissipated marital funds when she spent Husband's last paychecks and tax refunds to pay off her credit cards and living expens e s . "A trial court can abuse its discretion through the inaccurate resolution of factual issues or through the application of incorrect legal principles." State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Mo. banc 2009) (emphasis added); see supra n ote 4. The question of error, however, does not fully determine whether reversal is mandated. Lozano, 421 S.W.3d at 452. A p a rty is e ntitle d to re lie f fro m circuit court erro r only when the error materially affects the merits of the action. Rule 84.13(b). An erro r materially affects the merits of the action if it affects the result or outcome of the case. See Lozano, 421 S.W.3d at 452. The circuit court's error, here, affected the outcome of the case. The significance o f the d is s ip a t io n find in g is e vid e nt fro m the judgme nt expressly statin g the circuit court was not d ivid in g the ma rita l p ro p e rty into approximately equal shares, considering the nature of the assets of the parties, Wife's dissipation of marital assets, and the fact Wife discarded Husband's personal property. The importance of the erroneous dissipat io n

9

finding to the circuit court is further obvious from the circuit court's reference to it eight time s in the jud gme n t. 7 Because the court's error – a holding that Wife dissipated marita l funds when she paid marita l debts – ma te ria l ly affected the circuit court's property d ivis io n, Wife is entitled to a reversal of the division of marital property and remand so that a new d ivis io n o f ma rita l p ro p e rty c a n b e ma d e and the circuit court can exercise its discretion free from the incorrect application of law.

7 The judgme nt stated:

1. . . . . Wife testified that she used Husband's last paychecks and income

tax returns [sic] to pay off her debt and utilities.

1. . . . . Wife testified that she used Husband's last paychecks from his

employer and the income tax return [sic] to pay off her debt and utilities.

1. . . . . Wife testified that she used Husband's last three paychecks and the

tax return [sic] to pay her credit cards off and to pay bills and utilities. . . .

1. . . . . Wife testified that she used Husband's last three paychecks and the

tax return [sic] to pay her credit cards off and to pay bills and utilities. . . .

1. . . . . Credible evidence was adduced that Wife allocated Husband's last

three paychecks and tax returns [s ic ]. Wife testified she used the money to pay off Wife's debt and the maintenance and utilities of the residence.

1. . . . . Wife testified that she utilized Husband's last three paychecks and

the tax returns [sic] to pay off her debt.

1. Wife testified she utilized Husband's last paychecks and income taxes

to pay off all debt.

1. . . . In arriving at the division of marital property, . . . the court has not

intended to set off the marital property into approximately equal shares, c o ns id e r in g . . . W ife [s ic ] d is s ip a t io n o f ma rtia l [s ic] assets as she testified she used Husband's last paychecks and tax returns [sic] to pay off her credit card debt and bills and utilities.

10 The p rinc ip a l o p inio n r eaches the opposite result because it concludes the circuit court's error did not prejudice Wife. Rather, the principal opinion find s a ny mis a p p lic a t i o n of the law by the circuit court in the property division was irrelevant because the property d ivis io n disproportionately favored W ife, citing as inferential support a single decision from the court of appeals, Knapp v. Knapp, 874 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1994). The principal opinion ignores the fact the circuit court's error materially affected the merits of the action and Wife received less than all relief she requested. In this way, the p rinc ip a l o p inio n rules contrary to this C ourt's prior decisions holding circuit court error prejudiced the appellant even when the error had no effect on the party the judgme n t ultimate ly favored . See Williams v . Mercy Clinic Springfield Cmty s., 568 S.W.3d 396, 420 (Mo. banc 2019) (reversing a judgment in favor of the appellant when the circuit court's erroneous application of law affected the amount awarded as damages); Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Mo. banc 2010) (finding circuit court error prejudiced the plaint if f although the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded her damages). These cases demonstrate error is prejudicial if a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached without the error. The circuit court expressly based its distribution of property and debts on an erroneous legal conclus io n that Wife squandered ma rita l funds when she used Husba nd ' s paychecks and an income tax refund to pay off her credit cards and living expenses. It fo llows that the outcome was affected by the abuse of discretion result ing from the court ' s

11 erroneous application of law; t herefore, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded. 8 ___________________________________ PATRICIA BRECKENRID GE, JUDGE 8 If the property divis io n in the judgme nt is reversed and remanded, conflic t in g factua l determinatio ns relevant to the property divis io n should be reexamined on remand. For example, the circuit court found in paragraph 24 that there is credible evidence that Wife earns gross wages of $22,000 annually, or $1,833 per month. This c o nflic t s with a find ing in paragraph 26 that Wife's total gross monthly income is $2,341. There is no evidence in the record that her income was $2,341. The judgment also found W ife testified she was able to meet her reasonable needs. She did not. Rather, she testified she was not seeking child support or maintenance because husband would not be able to pay because of his lik e ly lo ng-term incarceration for sex crimes against their daughter. Nevertheless, the circuit court found W ife presented no credible evidence that she could not meet her reasonable needs. The error in the circuit court finding Wife could meet her reasonable needs and those of the daughter witho ut maint e na nc e or child support is further supported by Wife's le ga l aid counsel statement. It declare d the a mo unt o f W ife 's inc o me s till me t Legal S e rvic e's income guidelines because her earnings were within 125 percent of the poverty rate and she qualified for a certificate of inability to pay costs. The judgment indicates the circuit court believed counsel's statement because the circuit court ordered the guardia n ad lit e m fee be paid by the Permanency Project Grant. Additionally, when setting aside to the parties their separate property, the judgment relies on Exhib it 7 to denomina te the separate, nonmarital property. Exhibit 7, however, does not list separate property. It merely stipulates that certain marital property should be awarded to Wife and other marital property awarded to Husband. It is no t evidence from which the court could determine and set aside to the parties their separate property. Most important is the fact the circuit court did not find there was a debt on the Chevy Cruze vehicle it awarded Wife that was greater than the value of the vehicle although Husband included such debt in all of his evidence before the Court. The circuit court's failure to expressly acknowledge this undisputed debt is the basis for the principa l o p inio n's finding the circuit court did not err in its division of property.