In the Interest of: K.M.D. and R.M.D. Juvenile Officer vs. S.M.D

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.M.D. and ) R.M.D. ) ) JUVENILE OFFICER, ) ) WD87912 Respondent, ) (Consolidated with WD87913) ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) November 18, 2025 ) S.M.D., ) ) Appellant. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri The Honorable Jacqueline A. Cook, Judge Before Division Three: Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, and Karen King Mitchell, Judge S. M.D. ("Mother") appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri, Juvenile Division ("trial court") terminating her parental rights to K.M.D. and R.M.D. (collectively, "children"). On appeal, Mother asserts claims of trial court error related to the admission of certain evidence and challenges the trial court's

2 termination of her parental rights, 1 making both sufficiency-of-the-evidence and against- the-weight-of-the-evidence challenges. After a thorough review of the record and briefing on appeal, we affirm the judgment and remand with instructions to address Mother's appointed counsel's motion for attorney's fees. Factual and Procedural History 2

On May 20, 2021, Mother gave birth to K.M.D. Prior to K.M.D.'s birth, Mother obtained a protective order against Father but later dismissed it. While at the hospital for K.M.D.'s birth, Father displayed aggressive behavior toward hospital staff and interfered with Mother's ability to obtain medical care. Hospital security was called to address Father's conduct, and a hotline report was made to Missouri's Children's Division ("Children's Division"). At the time of K.M.D.'s release from the hospital, Father agreed to undergo an in-patient psychiatric assessment, and Mother agreed to take K.M.D. to reside with Father's sister. After Mother left her sister-in-law's home with K.M.D., concerns that Mother was allowing Father to engage in unsupervised time with K.M.D. led the Cass County Juvenile Office to take protective custody of K.M.D. on May 26,

1 It was undisputed at trial that R.D. ("Father") is the biological father of the children. Father has separately appealed from the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights in Int. of K.M.D., No. WD87926 (Mo. App. W.D. appeal docketed Sept. 30, 2025). We have used initials to identify the children and their parents to protect the identity of the children as required by section 509.520.1(7). All statutory references are to T HE REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI (2016), as supplemented through December 29, 2023, unless otherwise indicated. And, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not identify the names of non-party witnesses in our ruling today. 2 "When reviewing a judgment terminating parental rights, we view the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment." Int. of E.R., 687 S.W.3d 174, 175 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).

3 On May 7, 2022, Mother gave birth to R.M.D. On the day of R.M.D.'s birth, Father acted erratically and became physically and verbally abusive toward hospital staff. After a hotline report was made to Children's Division, Mother spoke with an investigator. When asked about her ability to parent, Mother ranked herself a zero on a zero-to-ten scale. On May 12, 2022, Children's Division took protective custody of R.M.D. At the time R.M.D. was taken into care, Children's Division had already been working with Mother on parenting skills for nearly a year. Children's Division then created a safety plan for Mother wherein she would live with R.M.D. at her mother's home ("Maternal Grandmother") because of ongoing domestic violence concerns between Mother and Father. However, on May 25, 2022, understanding that returning to reside with Father was contrary to the safety plan, Mother left R.M.D. at Maternal Grandmother's home and resumed living with Father. Mother understood at the time she returned to live with Father that R.M.D. would be taken into protective custody as a result. While the children were in the care and legal custody of Children's Division, Mother was informed of the goals she would need to complete to reunify with the children. Children's Division provided Mother with written service agreements setting out the goals and tasks she was to complete. Mother's caseworker ("Caseworker") regularly discussed all applicable goals with Mother, and Mother indicated she understood what was expected of her through the pendency of the case. Caseworker and Mother were often in contact multiple times per day, discussing parenting and the steps Mother needed to take for reunification.

4 Throughout the pendency of the case, Children's Division provided Mother with the resources and opportunity to reunify with the children. Many services and resources were offered consistently to Mother: psychiatric evaluation, medication management, parenting education, anger management, domestic violence support groups, individual and couples' therapy, vocational rehabilitation, subsidized housing, and assistance with obtaining diapers, cribs, and household furnishings. Caseworker even offered to assist Mother with the process of purchasing a car and teaching her how to drive the car. Despite the many resources offered to her, Mother failed to take advantage of the full range of these services. On December 29, 2023, the Cass County Juvenile Officer filed a petition to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights. A five-day bench trial was held between September 24, 2024, and November 21, 2024. At trial, the Juvenile Officer presented evidence from seven witnesses: Caseworker, a temporary caseworker, an investigator from the Office of the Child Advocate, one of Mother's therapists, two clinical psychologists ("Dr. G.S."), 3 Father's domestic violence counselor, and a licensed professional counselor and clinical psychologist ("K.A."). Mother chose to testify at trial and presented evidence from three additional witnesses: Mother's sister, Mother's aunt, and Mother's grandmother.

3 We do not identify or discuss the findings of the second clinical psychologist, Dr. A.C., that testified at trial because the trial court explicitly chose not to credit that psychologist's testimony in its judgment.

5 Dr. G.S. testified to the results of Mother's psychological, parenting, and IQ testing. Dr. G.S. diagnosed Mother with Child Neglect, Mild Intellectual Disability, and Bipolar Disorder. Dr. G.S. observed that, consistent with her diagnoses, Mother lacked common sense and judgment and often acts inappropriately in emergency situations. Mother also exhibited a limited range of general knowledge and poor problem-solving abilities. Dr. G.S. indicated that Mother had an inability to maintain employment, difficulty maintaining a suitable home for the children, and poor adaptive skills. Dr. G.S. found that Mother suffered from anxiety and low self-confidence. As such, Dr. G.S. recommended Mother participate in mental health and parenting services including (1) remaining compliant with prescribed mood stabilizing medication; (2) individual therapy that included supportive therapy techniques to learn to control moods and anxiety; (3) parenting skills training, including instruction from a parent aide or home-based counselor; (4) family therapy; and (5) Parents as Teachers. At trial, Dr. G.S. testified that he had continuing concerns about Mother's ability to safely parent the children. Caseworker testified that the barriers to reunification between Mother and the children at the time the children were taken into custody by Children's Division included poor parenting skills, concerns of domestic violence, lack of stable housing, and mental health concerns. At trial, Caseworker testified that the barriers to reunification with Mother continued to be poor parenting skills, ongoing concerns of domestic violence, lack of stable housing, and mental health concerns. At trial, evidence demonstrated that Mother continued to fail to meet important goals for reunification.

6 First, Mother failed to obtain stable and appropriate housing. At trial, Mother indicated that she was presently living with her grandmother and her father, but her grandmother frequently threatened to stop allowing Mother to live at the home. In addition, Mother's father had indicated that he would not support the children living in the same residence, and Mother could point to no alternative living arrangement if she were to be reunified with the children. Second, Mother did not successfully complete any of the reunification goals related to her mental health treatment. Mother participated in therapy, but often switched therapists and did not complete services. Third, there continued to be ongoing concerns that Mother and Father were in contact with each other despite obtaining a divorce and despite Mother being expressly informed that her continued contact with Father would likely prohibit reunification. Additionally, Mother began another toxic relationship with another male individual she described as verbally and physically abusive. Fourth, though Mother engaged in some parenting education and parent aide services, she never completed those programs and struggled to implement the parenting education she had been taught. Finally, although Mother engaged in supervised visitation with the children, she never progressed to fully unsupervised visits. In its judgment, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights to K.M.D. and R.M.D. The trial court also concluded that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

7 Mother timely appealed. Additional facts will be discussed as required in connection with our review of Mother's appeal. Deficiencies in Mother's Appellate Briefing Before addressing any of Mother's substantive arguments, we note that Mother failed to observe the requirements all litigants are expected to comply with in order for this Court to review the merits of their claims on appeal. "Rule 84.04 provides the mandatory requirements for briefs filed in all appellate courts." Int. of S.R.W., 715 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Phox v. Boes, 702 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024)). "Compliance with Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory in order to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates by speculating on facts and on arguments that have not been made." Shelton v. Shelton, 717 S.W.3d 810, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting B.A. v. Ready, 634 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)). "Rule 84.04(c) requires that an appellant's statement of facts 'be a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument.'" Id. (emphasis in original). "[T]he primary purpose of the statement of facts is to afford an immediate, accurate, complete and unbiased understanding of the facts of the case." Id. (quoting Acton v. Rahn, 611 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). Further, in any bench-tried case, the appellate court views the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2014). Here, Mother simply omits many facts favorable to the judgment, some of which the trial court explicitly relied on in its judgment. Mother's statement of facts impermissibly

8 argues her interpretation of the evidence at trial and disregards our factual standard of review. See Shelton, 717 S.W.3d at 816. Rule 84.04(e) states that "[f]or each claim of error, the argument shall also include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved; and the applicable standard of review." Bell-Kaplan v. Schwarze, 712 S.W.3d 836, 847 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (alteration in original). Mother's brief fails to include any preservation statements. Rule 81.12(a) requires that "the record on appeal shall contain all of the record, proceedings and evidence necessary to the determination of all questions to be presented, . . . to the appellate court for decision." (emphasis added). Mother has failed to provide this Court with the report created by K.A. that she alleges contains inadmissible hearsay and is the subject of her Point II on appeal. Finally, we note that Mother's legal arguments fail to comply with the "distinct analytical framework" required: A not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenge requires completion of three sequential steps: (1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment; (2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition; and, (3) demonstrate why that favorable evidence, when considered along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, does not have probative force upon the proposition such that the trier of fact could not reasonably decide the existence of the proposition. On the other hand, an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge requires completion of four sequential steps:

9 (1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is necessary to sustain the judgment; (2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the existence of that proposition; (3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to the belief of that proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial court's credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit; and, (4) demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, is so lacking in probative value, when considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, that it fails to induce belief in that proposition. Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 187 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). Points I and III-VII collectively purport to challenge that the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights lacks substantial evidence and is against the weight of the evidence. 4

4 Points I and V argue the trial court's findings are both against the weight of the evidence and are not supported by substantial evidence. Importantly, a weight-of-the- evidence challenge concedes that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the judgment. Brownfield v. Heman, 711 S.W.3d 386, 402 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). In addition, Mother's points relied on are multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d)—they advance two distinct legal arguments in a single point on appeal. See, e.g., Kirk v. State, 520 S.W.3d 443, 450 n.3 (Mo. banc 2017) ("Kirk's first point relied on is clearly multifarious, containing more than one basis for reversal. Multifarious points relied on are noncompliant with Rule 84.04(d) and preserve nothing for review." (citation modified)). In Points III, IV, and VI, Mother fails to articulate which type of challenge she is making to the judgment. "Under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976), this Court will affirm the judgment of the trial court 'unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.'" Hampton v. Llewellyn, 663 S.W.3d 899, 902 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). In order to comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04, "a point on appeal must proceed under one of the Murphy v. Carron grounds, each of which requires a distinct analytical framework." Id. (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Am. Home Mtg. Inv. Tr. 2006-3 v. Luna, 655 S.W.3d 820, 826 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). Nevertheless, Mother's arguments are "readily discernible," enabling us to exercise our discretion to review her points for

10 In all of Mother's not-supported-by-substantial-evidence and against-the-weight- of-the-evidence challenges, Mother fails to direct this Court to all evidence favorable to the challenged factual proposition. In her weight-of-the-evidence challenges, Mother also fails to resolve evidentiary conflicts in the testimony in accordance with the trial court's credibility determinations. "Adherence to Houston's analytical framework is mandatory because it reflects the underlying criteria necessary for a successful challenge—the absence of any such criteria, even without a court-formulated sequence, dooms an appellant's challenge." Bell-Kaplan, 712 S.W.3d at 846 (citation modified). Although Mother's non-compliance with Rule 84.04 and Houston v. Crider is grounds for dismissal, we are mindful that "[t]he termination of parental rights is 'an exercise of awesome power and should not be done lightly.'" Int. of S.J.H., 124 S.W.3d 63, 66 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). It is "characterized as tantamount to a 'civil death penalty.'" Int. of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004). Given the fact that termination of parental rights is "one of the most serious acts a court is empowered to perform," we choose to exercise our discretion to address the merits of Mother's claims, Int. of A.M.F., 140 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (quoting Int. of B.N.W., 115 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003)), noting that Mother's briefing deficiencies do not impede our ability to understand most of Mother's arguments on appeal, Shelton, 717 S.W.3d at 815 ("Dismissal of an appeal for briefing deficiencies is discretionary, and this

substantive merit. Id. Our analysis assumes Mother is arguing the judgment and the findings she challenges are not supported by substantial evidence.

11 discretion is generally not exercised unless the deficiencies impede a disposition of the case on its merits."). Standards of Review Appellate review of termination of parental rights is governed by the generally accepted principles of all bench-tried cases: This Court reviews whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was presented to support a statutory ground for terminating parental rights under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). Therefore, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. The judgment will be reversed only if we are left with a firm belief that the order is wrong. Conflicting evidence will be reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Appellate courts will defer to the trial court's credibility assessments. When the evidence poses two reasonable but different inferences, this Court is obligated to defer to the trial court's assessment of the evidence. . . . After this Court determines that one or more statutory ground has been proven by clear, convincing, and cogent evidence, this Court must ask whether termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. At the trial level, the standard of proof for this best interest inquiry is a preponderance of the evidence; on appeal, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. banc 2011); see also J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626. This standard of review applies to our review of Points I and III-VII. However, as to our review of Point II, a challenge to the admissibility of evidence at trial, our standard of review is for an abuse of discretion. The trial court enjoys "considerable discretion" in its decision to admit or exclude evidence at trial. Int. of J.W.C., 680 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). "An abuse of discretion occurs

12 when the court's decision is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Id. (quoting Int. of A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). "If reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the trial court's action, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion." Id. (quoting Reed v. Kansas City Mo. Sch. Dist., 504 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). "Moreover, even if we find an error, we will not reverse unless that error materially affected the merits of the action." Id. (citation modified) (quoting Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Mo. banc 2015)). "To find reversible error, the appellant must demonstrate he or she was prejudiced by the admission of that evidence." Id. Analysis For ease of discussion, we take the points on appeal out of order. Point II: Admission of Expert's Report 5

In Point II, Mother argues that the trial court erred in admitting a report prepared by the Juvenile Officer's expert, K.A., a licensed professional counselor and licensed clinical social worker. Mother contends K.A.'s social study and investigative report was not admissible because it contained hearsay. In all termination cases, except those based on the consent of a parent, the court must order an investigative and social study report. § 211.455.3. The report must be

5 We address Mother's challenge to the admissibility of evidence first "in order to determine the universe of evidence from which to decide whether a proposition necessary to sustain a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence or is against the weight of the evidence." Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 187 n.8 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).

13 made available to the court "to aid the court in determining whether the termination is in the best interests of the child." Id. 6 "Section 211.455.3 does not itself authorize the court to use the social report to determine whether one of the statutory grounds of termination exists, and . . . unless another ground for admission exists for all or part of the report, it should be considered by the court only on the issue of whether termination is in the best interests of the child." Int. of J.A.R., 968 S.W.2d 748, 750-51 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). At trial, when the Juvenile Officer moved to admit the report, Mother's counsel objected as follows: "Your Honor, I would object. The social study, even though it is statutorily mandated, there is nothing in the statute that mandates this that allows the admission of a document that contains not only hearsay, but double and multiple-layer hearsay such as is included in this report." The trial court admitted the report over Mother's objection, noting that the court would "disregard that which is legally not admissible" in the report. And, the trial court informed Mother that it would entertain more specific objections to any specific portions of the report as K.A. testified to its contents. To the contrary, Mother failed to object to any specific portions of the report during K.A.'s testimony about the contents of the report. This is important for several reasons. First, when Mother raised her objection to admission of the report at trial, she objected to the report as a whole. "If any part of an exhibit is admissible an objection

6 Of course, "[t]he court may reach the issue of the best interests of the children only after it has made a determination that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination exists." Int. of J.A.R., 968 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (quoting Int. of M.H., 859 S.W.2d 888, 896 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993)); § 211.447.6.

14 going to the whole of it is properly overruled." Breshears v. Union Elec. Co., 373 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Mo. banc 1964) (citation modified); see also Crockett ex rel. Crockett v. Schlingman, 741 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987); Happy v. Blanton, 303 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Mo. 1957). As Mother identified in her objection, section 211.455.3 authorizes the trial court to consider the contents of the report in its determination of the best interests of the child. See J.A.R., 968 S.W.2d at 750-51 (discussing that although section 211.455.3 "does not itself authorize the court to use the social report to determine whether one of the statutory grounds of termination exists," the court may nevertheless consider the report on the issue of the best interests of the child). Thus, the trial court properly overruled Mother's objection to the report as it was stated. Second, at no time at trial did Mother assert the objection she raises for the first time on appeal—that the trial court failed to limit admission of the report solely to the issue relating to the trial court's "best interests" ruling. "Arguments not raised before the trial court . . . are not preserved for review on appeal because we will not convict a trial court of error on an issue that was not put before the trial court to decide." Irving v. Angstrom, 702 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Stanton v. City of Skidmore, 620 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)); see also, e.g., Int. of E.G., 683 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Mo. banc 2024) ("It is well recognized that a party should not be entitled on appeal to claim error on the part of the [trial] court when the party did not call attention to the error at trial and did not give the court the opportunity to rule on the question." (quoting Mayes v. Saint Luke's Hosp. of Kansas City, 430 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. banc 2014)). Since Mother is raising a new argument relating to the social

15 study and investigative report on appeal that was not raised below, we will not convict the trial court of error when it was deprived of any opportunity to consider or rule on Mother's present argument at trial. See Lange v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc., 708 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Mo. banc 2025) ("It is inappropriate for a reviewing court to assign error to a lower court for issues never raised before it."). As a result, Mother failed to preserve this particular argument for our review. Finally, Mother did not even present this Court with the very report she claims was inadmissible. "[A]n appellant's failure to make exhibits that are claimed to have been improperly admitted a part of the appellate record precludes review of the propriety of the trial court's ruling." Clay v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 951 S.W.2d 617, 625 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997); see also Jenkins v. Revolution Helicopter Corp., Inc., 925 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Gannon, 898 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995). As the appellant, Mother has a duty to provide this Court with the record on appeal. Her failure to provide the report for our review waives her argument on appeal. Aside from numerous preservation errors that are fatal to Mother's claim of error on appeal as to the admissibility of the written report of K.A. at trial, Mother ignores that K.A. testified extensively at trial without objection about the contents of K.A.'s report— testimony that centered on Mother's ongoing parental reunification challenges relating to housing, domestic violence, mental health concerns, and other parenting challenges that led K.A. to believe that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother bears the burden, on appeal, to demonstrate she suffered prejudice

16 related to the admission of the report. J.W.C., 680 S.W.3d at 584. But, even if we were to conclude that the report was somehow inadmissible—which we cannot even consider because Mother has failed to provide the report to this Court in the record on appeal— "[i]mproperly admitted evidence merely cumulative to evidence admitted without objection does not result in prejudice." Id. "Cumulative evidence is additional evidence reiterating the same point." Id. (quoting Int. of T.D.S., 643 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). Thus, even without considering the contents of the report, "the trial court had before it testimony reiterating the same point[.]" Id. Mother cannot demonstrate she suffered any prejudice from any erroneous admission of K.A.'s report. Point II is denied. Points I, III, and V: Statutory Grounds for Termination "[S]atisfaction of only one ground is sufficient to sustain the judgment." Int. of I.Q.S., 200 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). Point III: section 211.447.5(3)—failure to rectify a dangerous condition In Point III, Mother argues the trial court lacked substantial evidence to conclude that termination of her parental rights was proper under section 211.447.5(3). Section 211.447.5(3) provides that a parent's parental rights may be terminated if: The child has been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for a period of one year, and the court finds that the conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist, that there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, or the continuation of the parent- child relationship greatly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.

17 In her point, Mother raises three distinct arguments to the trial court's conclusion, all of which we reject. First, Mother asserts that no substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that the conditions which led to the assumption of the juvenile court's jurisdiction continue to exist. Mother contends that the record demonstrates the juvenile court only assumed jurisdiction because of Father's erratic behavior at the hospital during K.M.D.'s birth and Mother's statement during the incident that her parenting skills were a "zero out of ten." Although Father's erratic and dangerous behavior and Mother's admission that she possessed no parenting skills were conditions that caused the juvenile court to take jurisdiction, Mother ignores in her appellate briefing that Caseworker testified to numerous other conditions that caused the juvenile court to take jurisdiction, and Caseworker further testified that those conditions continued to persist: Q: And in regards to the mother, what were the barriers to reunification at the time of removal? A: Parenting education, stable housing, parenting skills, and mental health. Q: And were there also the concerns for domestic violence? A: Yes. Q: And what are the current barriers to reunification— A: The— Q: —in regards to Mother? A: The current barriers continue to be parenting education and parenting skills, the concern of future domestic violence within the relationship, as well as stable housing and mental health.

18 Q. And when you say "domestic violence within the relationship," is that both with . . . [Mother's] current paramour, and [Father], should [Mother and Father] resume a relationship? A. Yes. The trial court, in its judgment, credited this testimony, among other evidence, and identified several reasons other than the incident at the hospital which led the juvenile court to exercise its jurisdiction: "[w]hen each child came under juvenile court jurisdiction, the mother's lack of parenting skills, lack of protective capabilities, unsafe home environment, and mental health issues were among the concerns." Caseworker's testimony constitutes substantial and sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's finding that clear and cogent evidence reflected that the conditions which caused the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction persist. Second, Mother argues that the trial court lacked clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to conclude that Mother's continuing conduct placed the children at significant risk of future harm. Specifically, Mother argues that the only evidence of potential future harm stemming from the ongoing circumstances was "speculation" that Mother may reunite with Father and that Father may abuse the children. As an initial matter, the trial court's finding that Mother may reunite with Father and that this reunion could expose the children to potential abuse is supported by substantial and sufficient evidence. Although Mother asserts that the two have separated and that any evidence of a future reunion is mere "speculation" based on their past relationship, the trial court noted in its judgment that it received considerable evidence

19 indicating Mother harbors ongoing intentions to reunite with Father, even though she understands that the relationship is likely to be harmful to herself and her children: Despite issues of domestic violence and understanding that the Juvenile Court and the Children's Division required that for reunification she not reside with father, mother returned to father to reside on at least four separate occasions. Mother acknowledged during her testimony that it was difficult to leave father. This difficulty arose from her feelings and need for father as well as his controlling nature. She testified that she returned to father despite understanding that the decision to return damaged her chances with reunification with the minor children. Text messages were introduced into evidence that mother continued to communicate with father despite agreements with Court and the Children's Division. These text messages suggested that the mother and father were attempting to delete messages in order to avoid disclosure. Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded, despite Mother's assertions to the contrary, that Mother and Father maintain an ongoing relationship that poses a risk of future harm to the children: Mother and father continue to have a volatile relationship. Mother has made several credible inferences or statements that she may return to father once the children are back in her care or that she may engage in co- parenting with father. Such actions would fail to protect the minor children; Mother continues to show an interest in father. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Mother's continuing conduct involving Father poses a significant and continuing risk of potential future harm is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 7

In her final argument of Point III, Mother asserts that the trial court failed to support its determination that termination was proper under section 211.447.5(3) with

7 Furthermore, as discussed in our analysis of Point VI, the trial court identified several other areas of potential future harm, including Mother's ongoing inability to properly monitor and parent the minor children, act effectively in emergency situations, and provide the children with proper nutrition, financial support, and stable housing.

20 substantial evidence and that the trial court failed to make sufficiently specific findings of facts in its judgment, indicating a misapplication of the applicable statutory standard. As an initial matter, Mother waived any objection to the trial court's failure to make statutorily required findings when she did not file a Rule 78.07(c) post-trial motion challenging the trial court's alleged failure to comply with statutory requirements in the form of its judgment. Ordinarily, a party need not file an after-trial motion to preserve an argument for appeal following a bench trial: "Except as otherwise provided in Rule 78.07(c), in cases tried without a jury or with an advisory jury, neither a motion for a new trial nor a motion to amend the judgment or opinion is necessary to preserve any matter for appellate review if the matter was previously presented to the trial court." Rule 78.07(b) (emphasis added). However, Rule 78.07(c) specifically requires a party to file an after-trial motion to amend the judgment in order to preserve any argument that the trial court failed to make statutorily required findings: "In all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review." Rule 78.07(c) (emphasis added). Even so, the trial court did make all findings required by section 211.447.5(3), and Mother's claim to the contrary is simply not supported by the plain language of the meticulously detailed "factor analysis" performed by the trial court in its judgment. 8

8 To any extent that Mother argues the trial court erred in failing to make other specific findings of fact beyond those required by statute, we reject any such argument. A trial court is generally not required to make any findings of fact not required by statute unless requested by one of the parties:

21 Point III is denied. Further, given our conclusion that the trial court's judgment analyzing the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting its section 211.447.5(3) grounds for termination of parental rights is supported by sufficient and substantial evidence, we need not and do not discuss the other alternative statutory ground for termination of parental rights that was relied upon by the trial court in its judgment. Accordingly, we deny as moot Points I and V arguing error relating to an alternative statutory basis for parental rights termination. Point VI: Future Harm Closely related to Mother's Point III claim of error, Mother's Point VI reiterates her claim that there is no substantial evidence supporting any link between Mother's diagnoses and past behavior that would establish by clear, cogent, and convincing

The court may, or if requested by a party shall, include in the opinion findings on the controverted material fact issues specified by the party. Any request for an opinion or findings of fact shall be made on the record before the introduction of evidence at trial or at such later time as the court may allow. All fact issues upon which no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found in accordance with the result reached. Rule 73.01(c) (emphasis added); see also Schutter v. Seibold, 632 S.W.3d 820, 827 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) ("A trial court is not obligated to make findings of fact unless a proper request for same is timely made by a party pursuant to Rule 73.01(c)."); Dorman v. Dorman, 91 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (explaining that Rule 73.01(c) requires "the request [for findings of fact] to specify the controverted fact issues on which the party is seeking findings" and that, when a party's request fails to identify the requested findings with specificity, "the request for findings of fact is inadequate and the court's failure to issue findings of fact is not erroneous"). Here, the record does not include any request pursuant to Rule 73.01(c) for additional findings of fact nor any specification of what controverted facts the trial court should have found.

22 evidence that her present behavior points to a likelihood of future harm to the children should she be reunified with them. We disagree. "An essential part of any determination whether to terminate parental rights is whether, considered at the time of the termination and looking to the future, the child would be harmed by a continued relationship with the parent." K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 9. "When a court relies on a parent's past behavior to find abuse or neglect, it must make some explicit consideration of whether the past acts indicate a likelihood of future harm." Int. of Q.A.H., 426 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation modified) (citing K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 9-10). "In this manner, the parent's past conduct may be good evidence of future behavior, but it must be 'convincingly linked' to future behavior." Id. "It is not necessary to wait until children are harmed in order to find a causal relation between a mental disability or disease and harm to the children." Int. of D.T.H., 652 S.W.3d 738, 754 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). Here, in its judgment, the trial court not only described Mother's past behavior but also concluded, from evidence it found credible, that her past behavior continued to pose a likelihood of harm to the children in the future. As detailed in our analysis of Point III, the evidence established that Mother had ongoing issues with domestic violence in her relationships. Despite Mother's awareness that, in order to reunify with her children, she could not reside with Father, Mother returned to reside with Father on at least four separate occasions. And, evidence relating to text messages between Mother and Father not only suggested that they were

23 continuing to plan to reside together but also suggested they were attempting to delete their text conversations to hide it from the trial court. 9

Providing medical evidence demonstrating why Mother continues to struggle with the self-discipline to avoid volatile relationships that would place the children in harm's way, expert testimony at trial was adduced showing that Mother continues to suffer from Bipolar Disorder and an intellectual disability—conditions that will be present for the entirety of Mother's life. Dr. G.S. testified that, as a result of Mother's mental conditions, she lacks good judgment, has poor problem-solving and adaptive skills, and suffers from anxiety and low self-confidence. Dr. G.S. indicated that the effects of her mental health diagnoses inhibit her ability to appropriately supervise the children and to act effectively to protect the children from danger. The evidence at trial also suggested that Mother continues to lack stable housing; that she is unable to engage in sustained employment to produce a source of income to support herself and the children; and that she continues to struggle with simple day-to- day tasks of parenting, such as feeding her children and using appropriate discipline when she is around the children. Though Children's Division has provided extensive parenting education to Mother to address all of these issues, the medical expert testimony at trial

9 And, Mother has engaged in another volatile relationship with another individual who has been physically and emotionally abusive to her. The trial court found that despite receiving counseling on the issues of domestic violence and the barriers it poses to reunification, Mother continues to lack the self-discipline to end or avoid relationships that put her and the children at risk of harm if left unsupervised.

24 indicated that Mother's mental health diagnoses have simply prevented her from learning, retaining, and applying the parenting education she has received. Simply put, Mother seeks to have this Court reweigh the credibility of the evidence from the trial below and to place more credibility on Mother's version of the facts than the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to the contrary that is in the record from the trial proceedings below. "It is the trial court's province to weigh the evidence, not ours." Int. of K.L., 561 S.W.3d 12, 21 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citing J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d at 627). "We are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence." Id. Point VI is denied. Point IV: Reasonable Efforts Towards Reunification In Point IV, Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that Children's Division made reasonable efforts toward reunification. 10 Section 211.183 states, in relevant part:

1. In juvenile court proceedings regarding the removal of a child from his

or her home, the court's order shall include a determination of whether the children's division has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child and, after removal, to make it possible for the child to return home. . . .

1. "Reasonable efforts" means the exercise of reasonable diligence and

care by the division to utilize all available services related to meeting the needs of the juvenile and the family. In determining reasonable efforts to be made and in making such reasonable efforts, the child's present and ongoing health and safety shall be the paramount consideration.

10 Mother incorrectly cites section 211.447 as the relevant statutory authority requiring the trial court to make a "reasonable efforts" finding in this case. However, it is section 211.183 that mandates a juvenile court to issue a finding that Children's Division made such reasonable efforts.

25

1. In support of its determination of whether reasonable efforts have been

made, the court shall enter findings, including a brief description of what preventive or reunification efforts were made and why further efforts could or could not have prevented or shortened the separation of the family. The division shall have the burden of demonstrating reasonable efforts. In its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court issued a finding that Children's Division made reasonable efforts and explained why those efforts had been unsuccessful: The Court finds that the Children's Division made reasonable efforts but mother has failed to make progress in complying with the terms of the social service plans and/or the juvenile court's orders so that the minor children may remain safely in her care. Mother struggles with parenting the minor children; Mother cannot be left alone with Child[ren] for an extended period of time due to concerns that Mother is easily distracted and inattentive, causing possible injuries to the minor children. Mother has been engaged in at least two separate relationships involving domestic violence. Mother and father continue to have a volatile relationship. Mother has made several credible inferences or statements that she may return to father once the children are back in her care or that she may engage in co-parenting with father. Such actions would fail to protect the minor children; Mother continues to show an interest in father. Mother has not obtained and maintained financial stability such that she could provide for the children. Mother could not outline the basic steps necessary to move into and maintain housing for herself. Mother has never lived alone. Mother was provided parent education throughout the underlying case; however, she has been unable to demonstrate an ability to consistently parent the children safely. First, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding Children's Division made reasonable efforts because "Children's Division failed to provide timely or consistent written service agreements." "A parent's efforts to comply with [a social service] plan will provide the court with an indication of the parent's likely efforts in the future to care for the child. A lack of effort to comply with a plan, or a lack of success despite effort, can predict future

26 problems." K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 10 (citation modified). Although efforts made by a parent to comply with a service plan is relevant evidence in a termination proceeding, a social service plan is not mandatory. Id. Furthermore, "[t]he failure of [Children's Division] to provide treatment or services to a parent is not a valid defense for use by the parent in a termination proceeding." Int. of N.D., 857 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993); see also Int. of J.M., 815 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991); Int. of A.L.B., 743 S.W.2d 875, 881 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987). Thus, even though Mother contends "there was no credible evidence that Mother failed or refused to comply with written service agreements when they were provided," the trial court was not required to make a finding to that effect. Mother's focus on the lack of written agreements also has no merit. The purpose of the reasonable efforts finding is "to ensure that all reasonable means to help the parent remedy the adverse conditions were utilized to no avail." In re A.S.O., 52 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001), cited in K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 10. With or without a written service agreement, Mother had adequate notice of the tasks expected of her and the goals she was to meet to reunify with the children. Caseworker testified that she was aware of and considered Mother's learning disabilities and mental health diagnosis when explaining to Mother what was expected of her in order to reunify with the children. Mother testified that she was aware of the court's orders and understood the tasks and goals set out for her. Furthermore, Caseworker maintained consistent contact with Mother, sometimes up to multiple times per day, and worked with her to create plans to reach those goals.

27 Second, Mother argues the trial court's finding that Children's Division made reasonable efforts is not supported by the record because the caseworker assigned to her was biased against her. Mother argues the record demonstrates Caseworker was biased against her because Caseworker was named as a defendant in a lawsuit brought by Father. "However, this analysis of the record violates our standard of review. . . ." Int. of L.S.H., 652 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, it is clear that the trial court chose to credit Caseworker's testimony and chose not to credit any contrary evidence Mother advanced through cross- examination. Caseworker denied any allegation that she treated Mother differently because of any ongoing lawsuit. Our standard of review prevents us from deviating from that credibility determination. The trial court concluded that Children's Division made reasonable efforts to address the barriers Mother faced to reunification with the children, and those findings are supported by the record. In fact, Caseworker's testimony demonstrated Caseworker provided services and opportunities to Mother that she would not generally offer to parents in other cases. Point IV is denied. Point VII: Best Interest Determination In Point VII, Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. "After finding a statutory basis for terminating parental rights, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the child's best interests." Int. of M.C., 717 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Mo. App.

28 W.D. 2025). "A finding that termination is in the child's best interest is a subjective assessment based on the totality of the circumstances." Int. of A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d 225, 244 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (citation modified) (quoting A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d at 349). Pursuant to section 211.447.7, the trial court must evaluate and make findings on the following seven "best interest" factors: (1) The emotional ties to the birth parent; (2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child; (3) The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care and maintenance of the child when financially able to do so including the time that the child is in the custody of the division or other child-placing agency; (4) Whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time; (5) The parent's disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child; (6) The conviction of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; provided, however, that incarceration in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights; (7) Deliberate acts of the parent or acts of another of which the parent knew or should have known that subjects the child to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm. "There is no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that all best interest factors must be negated before termination can take place; likewise, there is no minimum number of negative factors necessary for termination." Int. of B.K.B., 688 S.W.3d 579, 588 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d at 244).

29 Here, the trial court made the following findings on the best interests of the children: a. The minor children have some emotional ties to mother; however, such ties should not preclude the termination of mother's parental rights. b. Mother has maintained regular visitation with the minor children. However, mother's [visitation] continues to be supervised and mother continues to struggle with basic parenting skills. She requires assistance during her visitation. This circumstance is not healthy for the minor children. Mother has not made steady progress but rather has moved from supervised contact, to unsupervised contact, to unsupervised contact with minimal overnight stays with [Maternal Grandmother's] assistance, to supervised visitation once again. There are credible concerns regarding mother's mental condition, behavior and parenting abilities. Mother requires substantial support to raise the minor children. Consistent support from family or friends does not consistently exist. c. Although not ordered to pay child support, mother has not provided any other financial assistance for the cost of care and maintenance for the minor children. She has provided a few toys and some clothing for the minor children as well as a box of diapers and some furniture in her residence, but has not provided any consistent material support or monies for cost of care and maintenance during the period that the minor children were within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. d. Additional services offered by the Missouri Department of Social Services, Children's Division or the Juvenile Office would not likely bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the minor children to mother within an ascertainable period of time; e. Mother clearly loves and cares for her minor children and expressed a desire for reunification with the minor children, she has failed to accomplish the tasks required to improve her parenting abilities such that a return of the minor children to her care is possible; f. Mother has not been convicted of a felony offense that the court finds i[s] of such a nature that the minor children would be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; and, g. Mother has not committed deliberate acts nor are there acts of another of which mother knew or should have known that subjects the minor children to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm.

30 Mother challenges the trial court's findings as to statutory factors (1)-(3) and (5)-(7). Mother concedes that factor (4) is not favorable to her. We begin by noting that Mother's failure to challenge all seven factors can be fatal to her argument because the presence of a single factor can support the trial court's best interest determination. See Int. of N.D.P.H., 675 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) ("The presence of a single factor could support the determination of a child's best interest when it is reviewed in the totality of the circumstances[] and that finding is a subjective assessment made by the trial court that is not reweighed by this Court." (quoting Int. of M.K.S., 612 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020))); see also Int. of S.R.W., 717 S.W.3d 373, 389 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). However, even if we permit Mother to challenge the trial court's best interest factor analysis by arguing reversible error as to only some of the factors, her argument still fails. Mother's arguments challenging the trial court's statutory findings again asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in the light most favorable to Mother. As discussed extensively throughout this opinion, this Court will not reweigh the evidence. See S.R.W., 717 S.W.3d at 390; N.D.P.H., 675 S.W.3d at 784; Int. of C.E.B., 565 S.W.3d 207, 218 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018). "[Mother's] failure to consider our standard of review, as with h[er] previous 'not-supported-by-substantial-evidence' argument, makes h[er] challenge to the [trial] court's best interest findings of no analytical or persuasive value." J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d at 632. Furthermore, from the level of detail in the judgment, it is clear the trial court fully and carefully considered the best interest factors. The trial court was not required to find

31 that all of the best interest factors weighed against Mother to determine that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The trial court's finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children was not an abuse of discretion. Point VII is denied. Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees on Appeal While this appeal was pending, Mother's appointed counsel filed a motion seeking an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Local Rule 29 and 13 CSR 40-30.020. This motion was taken with the case. "Local Rule 29 requires that '[a]ny party claiming an amount due for attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to contract, statute or otherwise and which this Court has jurisdiction to consider, must file a separate written motion before submission of the cause.'" Int. of A.R.B., 586 S.W.3d 846, 866-67 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (alteration in original). "However, it is the more appropriate province of the trial court to determine whether and in what amount fees should be awarded to court-appointed counsel, even when the fees sought are for services on appeal." Int. of S.M.F., 393 S.W.3d 635, 653 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013); see also Int. of A.D.G., 23 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court so it may consider and rule on the pending motion for an award of attorney's fees for services Mother's appointed counsel has provided in representing Mother on this appeal.

32 Conclusion The trial court has committed no error in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights, and accordingly, we affirm the judgment. This case is remanded with instructions for the trial court to consider and rule on the pending motion for an award of attorney's fees. Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, and Karen King Mitchell, Judge, concur.

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