Filtered slip opinions

McGregory appealed his convictions for domestic assault in the third degree and property damage in the second degree, raising unpreserved claims of error regarding evidence admissibility and the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund judgment amount. The court affirmed the convictions but modified the CVC judgment amount, finding the trial court entered a judgment in excess of that authorized by law.

The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's disability discrimination and hostile work environment claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act because she failed to plead facts demonstrating legal disability or a hostile work environment based on disability. However, the court reversed and remanded the retaliation claim, finding that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts establishing the elements of retaliation under the Act based on her complaints of disability discrimination.

The court reversed defendant's convictions for second-degree property damage and fourth-degree assault because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing and failed to ensure a written waiver of counsel was entered prior to trial, as required by Missouri law. Although the defendant did not preserve the issue by objecting at trial, the court found the error must be reviewed because the failure to conduct a proper Faretta hearing is a constitutional violation that cannot be waived.

Appellant Deandre Walton appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of armed criminal action, and unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements and admitting evidence of his statements at trial. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding no error in the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.

Gerald Nytes appealed his conviction for violating a full order of protection, arguing the State failed to prove he had notice of the order as required by statute. The court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence of notice based on Nytes's presence at the contested order of protection hearing and his subsequent violation through phone calls made from jail to the protected party.

The court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief where appellant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to investigate his mental state. The appellant failed to establish how additional mental state information would have aided his defense or satisfied the prejudice requirement for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The court affirmed the circuit court's child custody and support judgment, rejecting Father's six points of error regarding the Form 14 calculations, denial of Line 11 credit despite equal visitation time, disproportionate attorney's and GAL fees, and exclusion of testimony on equitable abatement. The appellate court found that Father failed to meet the required analytical standards for challenging the judgment and that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the Line 11 credit and ruling against equitable abatement.

Appellant Derrie Williams appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction relief motion, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to allow him to testify and failed to investigate and call two witnesses. The court affirmed the motion court's judgment denying post-conviction relief, finding that the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous.

In this quiet title appeal, the court reversed the trial court's interpretation of an easement deed that the Daumes held over a private roadway. The court rejected the trial court's constructions that the easement's 'non-commercial purposes' limitation prohibited agricultural use and that it was restricted to the Daumes and their immediate family members.

David K. Duncan, Sr. was convicted of three counts of first-degree statutory rape and six counts of second-degree child molestation of his granddaughter. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding that the trial court properly admitted evidence of Duncan's statement to the victim that he had sex with his wife at the same age as the victim, ruling this was logically and legally relevant and not improper propensity evidence.

The court affirmed the defendant's conviction on two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant applied physical force that overcame the victim's reasonable resistance, constituting forcible compulsion. The defendant's arguments that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove forcible compulsion were rejected.

This Missouri appellate case addressed whether a company could set aside a default judgment that was entered against it more than one year earlier in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Celestina Gamez sued her former employer, EasyEx MO OFallon, LLC, claiming violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act and Workers' Compensation Law. After EasyEx was properly served but failed to respond, the trial court entered a default judgment in March 2024 awarding Gamez damages and attorney's fees. EasyEx did not attempt to challenge this judgment until April 2025—over one year later—when Gamez began collection efforts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of EasyEx's motion to set aside the default judgment. Under Missouri Rule 74.05(d), parties seeking to overturn a default judgment must act "within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the entry of the default judgment." The court rejected EasyEx's argument that the one-year deadline should run from when they received notice of the judgment rather than when it was entered, emphasizing that defaulting parties forfeit their right to notice under Missouri law. The court also awarded Gamez attorney's fees for defending the appeal, since she was the prevailing party under the Missouri Human Rights Act. This decision reinforces that Missouri's one-year deadline for challenging default judgments is strictly enforced and cannot be extended based on claims of lack of notice. For businesses and other litigants, this case underscores the critical importance of maintaining current contact information with registered agents and monitoring for potential lawsuits. Once a default judgment is entered, parties have limited time to act, and waiting until collection efforts begin is likely too late to seek relief from the court.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree rape and second-degree burglary. The appellate court affirmed the rape conviction but reversed the burglary conviction due to plain error in the jury instruction regarding second-degree burglary.

The court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief for Harry Little's convictions for murder in the second degree, armed criminal action, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Trial counsel's decisions not to call an alibi witness and not to argue a specific alternative perpetrator in closing argument constituted reasonable trial strategy rather than ineffective assistance of counsel.

Robinson was convicted of resisting arrest as a class E felony when he fled from arrest on an outstanding warrant for burglary in the first degree. The court affirmed, holding that resisting arrest can be elevated to a felony when the arrest is for a felony offense regardless of whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant.