Based on a comprehensive review of the substantial and competent evidence, including the testimony of Claimant, the expert medical opinions, the medical records, the exhibits admitted in evidence, the stipulations of the parties, and my personal observations of Claimant at the hearing, and based on the application of the Workers' Compensation Law, I make the following rulings of law.
- Did Claimant provide notice of his injury as required by law?
Section 287.800, RSMo ${ }^{1}$ provides in part that administrative law judges shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly and shall weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts.
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ All statutory references are to RSMo 2006 unless otherwise indicated. In a workers' compensation case, the statute in effect at the time of the injury is generally the applicable version. Chouteau v. Netco Construction, 132 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Mo.App. 2004); Tillman v. Cam's Trucking Inc., 20 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Mo.App. 2000). See also Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 217 S.W.3d 345 (Mo.App. 2007).
The Court in Allcorn v. Tap Enterprises, Inc., --- S.W.3d ----, 2009 WL 482355 (Mo.App. 2009) states at 2:
[A] strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed." 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58:2 (6th ed. 2008). The rule of strict construction does not mean that the statute shall be construed in a narrow or stingy manner, but it means that everything shall be excluded from its operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the language used. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 376 (1999). Moreover, a strict construction confines the operation of the statute to matters affirmatively pointed out by its terms, and to cases which fall fairly within its letter. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58:2 (6th ed. 2008). The clear, plain, obvious, or natural import of the language should be used, and the statutes should not be applied to situations or parties not fairly or clearly within its provisions. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58:2 (6th ed. 2008).
The Allcorn Court continues at 4: "Where strict construction is required, the court should not enlarge or extend the law, and only the clear, plain, obvious, or natural import of the language should be used. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58:2 (6th ed. 2008)."
Section 287.808, RSMo provides:
The burden of establishing any affirmative defense is on the employer. The burden of proving an entitlement to compensation under this chapter is on the employee or dependent. In asserting any claim or defense based on a factual proposition, the party asserting such claim or defense must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true.
Section 287.020.2, RSMo provides:
The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
Section 287.190.6(2), RSMo provides in part that permanent partial disability shall be demonstrated and certified by a physician.
Section 287.420, RSMo provides:
No proceedings for compensation for any accident under this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place and nature of the injury, and the name and address of the person injured, has been given to the employer no later than thirty days after the accident, unless the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice. No proceedings for compensation for any occupational disease or repetitive trauma under this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place, and nature of the injury, and the name and address of the person injured, has been given to the employer no later than thirty days after the diagnosis of the condition unless the employee can prove the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice.
Before the enactment of the 2005 Amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law, Section 287.420, RSMo provided:
No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place and nature of the injury, and name and address of the person injured, have been given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof but not later than thirty days after the accident, unless the division or the commission finds that there was good cause for failure to receive the notice. No defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall invalidate it unless the commission finds the employer was in fact misled and prejudiced thereby.
Section 287.420, RSMo in effect on the date of Claimant's injury does not have a "good cause" excuse for failing to provide notice as the earlier version of the statute does. An employee's failure to comply with the notice provision of the new law will not be excused even if he had good cause for failing to do so.
The Court in Seyler v. Spirtas Indus., 974 S.W.2d 536 (Mo.App. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Mo. 2003), states at 538:
If the claimant has not provided employer written notice within thirty days of the accident, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating
that the employer was not prejudiced by the claimant's failure to provide notice. Willis v. Jewish Hospital, 854 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo.App.1993).
See also Soos v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Co., 19 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Mo.App. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 225; Klopstein v. Schroll House Moving Co., 425 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Mo.App.1968).
The Seyler Court continues at 538:
The purpose underlying the notice requirement is twofold. First, the notice requirement is designed to ensure that the employer will be able to conduct an accurate and thorough investigation of the facts surrounding the injury. Id. The second purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure that the employer has the opportunity to minimize the employee's injury by providing prompt medical treatment. Id. Thus, in cases where the employer does not have actual notice of the accident, courts have examined whether the claimant has proffered evidence on both the employer's ability to investigate the accident and the minimization of the employee's injury in determining whether the employer was prejudiced by the claimant's failure to provide written notice. See Id.; Klopstein v. Schroll House Moving Co., 425 S.W.2d 498, 504-05 (Mo.App.1968).
See also Willis v. Jewish Hosp., 854 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo.App. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 229.
The Seyler Court continues at 539:
The only evidence produced below relating to the minimization of claimant's injuries suggests that claimant's injuries became progressively more severe after the accident. Based on this record, we find that claimant failed to demonstrate that his failure to provide written notice did not hinder employer's ability to minimize his injury by providing medical treatment. See Klopstein, 425 S.W.2d at 505.
The parties stipulated that on or about October 9, 2007, Claimant sustained an injury by accident or occupational disease in Kansas City, Clay County, Missouri, arising out of and in the course of his employment. I find that on October 9, 2007, Claimant sustained an injury to his left upper extremity in the bicep area, by accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer. I find that Claimant knew he sustained an injury to his left upper extremity in the bicep area at the time of the accident.
Claimant felt some pain in the left arm at the time of the accident, and he noticed bruising soon afterwards. As time went on after the accident, Claimant's left arm did not feel the same or look the same, his left arm was noticeably weaker than his right, and he had a lot of fatigue in the left arm.
I find that Claimant did not give any notice of his October 9, 2007 injury to Employer until February 14, 2008 when he called Mr. Rasmussen. I find that he did not provide any notice of his injury to Insurer until he provided a telephone statement to Gail Gutherie on February 22, 2008, and that he did not provide a written notice to Insurer until he sent his Injury Report dated February 28, 2008 to Insurer. I find that Claimant did not comply with Section 287.420, RSMo, and that he did not provide the required notice of his accidental injury to Employer or Insurer until more than thirty days after the accident.
Claimant asserts in his Brief that Employer did not advise Claimant before the accident that he "must report all injuries immediately to the employer" or risk jeopardizing his ability to receive workers' compensation benefits. He asserts given the off-premises nature of Claimant's work, Section 287.127, RSMo mandates personal written notification of the contents of the "posted notice."
287.127. 1, RSMo provides in part:
Beginning January 1, 1993, all employers shall post a notice at their place of employment, in a sufficient number of places on the premises to assure that such notice will reasonably be seen by all employees. An employer for whom services are performed by individuals who may not reasonably be expected to see a posted notice shall notify each such employee in writing of the contents of such notice. The notice shall include:
(2) That employees must report all injuries immediately to the employer by advising the employer personally, the employer's designated individual or the employee's immediate boss, supervisor or foreman and that the employee may lose the right to receive compensation if the injury or illness is not reported within thirty days or in the case of occupational illness or disease, within thirty days of the time he or she is reasonably aware of work relatedness of the injury or illness; employees who fail to notify their employer within thirty days may jeopardize their ability to receive compensation, and any other benefits under this chapter.
I find that Claimant did not prove that Employer did not post the required notice at its place of business, and did not prove that he may not reasonably be expected to see a posted notice. Claimant testified he was rarely in Employer's office. But he was there. Further, as noted before, Section 287.420, RSMo in effect on the date of Claimant's injury does not have a "good cause" excuse for failing to provide notice.
Claimant has the burden to prove that his delay in providing notice of his injury did not prejudice Employer. I find that Claimant failed to meet his burden. I find the record does not convincingly establish that the delay in notice to Employer did not hinder Employer's ability to minimize his injury by providing medical treatment.
The evidence does not specifically address whether Claimant's injury would have been minimized if he had been provided prompt medical treatment after the injury. Claimant had ten physical therapy sessions between April 22, 2008 and July 1, 2008. Some therapy records note his condition was progressing slowly, but the records do not specifically address whether his progress was or was not impaired because of a delay in treatment. The treating doctors do not address the issue directly. Dr. Stuckmeyer does not either. His October 27, 2008 report states in part: "Unfortunately, this injury was not attended to immediately, and I do not feel that surgical reconstruction would benefit Mr. Fuller due to the obvious atrophy, retraction of the muscle, and the likelihood that surgery would leave the patient with a flexion deformity at the elbow." (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Stuckmeyer does not specifically discuss what he means by that statement. He does not describe whether Claimant sustained any additional permanent disability due to a delay in treatment, or whether Claimant's treatment was prolonged or made more expensive by the delay. Dr. Stuckmeyer concludes that Claimant has a 30\% permanent partial disability to the left shoulder as a direct and proximate result of the accident. The wording of his report, "Unfortunately, this injury was not attended to immediately" suggests that the extent of his disability may have increased because of the delay in treatment.
The Court notes that Claimant did not miss time from work after his accident as a result of his injury, did not receive or request temporary total disability benefits, and elected not to have surgery on his left arm. However, I find that those facts do not establish that Employer was not hindered by the delayed notice of the accident. I find that Claimant did not prove that he would have had less expensive medical treatment or less permanent partial disability than he would have had if he had reported his injury to Employer as required by Section 287.420, RSMo. I find that Claimant failed to prove that his delay in providing notice to Employer did not hinder Employer's ability to minimize his injury by providing medical treatment.
In conclusion, based upon substantial and competent evidence and the application of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I find in favor of Employer and deny Claimant's request for benefits. I find that Claimant did not provide notice of his injury required by Section 287.420, RSMo, and that he did not meet his burden of demonstrating that Employer was not prejudiced by his failure to provide notice of his injury as required by Section 287.420, RSMo. Claimant's claim is denied. All other issues are moot.
Date: April 28, 2009
Made by: /s/ Robert B. Miner
Robert B. Miner
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
A true copy: Attest:
/s/ Naomi Pearson
Naomi Pearson
Division of Workers' Compensation