We reverse the award of the administrative law judge and deny compensation in this matter. All other issues are moot.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $\qquad 11 { }^{\text {th }} \qquad$ day of August 2011.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
Alice A. Bartlett, Member
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based upon my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the award and decision of the administrative law judge should be affirmed.
Years of case law make clear that a medical opinion is not always necessary to support the Commission's disability determination.
"The determination of the specific amount or percentage of disability is a finding of fact within the special province of the Commission." "When the Commission makes the determination of disability it is not strictly limited to the percentages of disability testified to by the medical experts." Id. Moreover, this court has held that "[t]he Commission is authorized to base its findings and award solely on the testimony of a claimant. His testimony alone, if believed, constitutes substantial evidence . . . of the nature, cause, and extent of his disability."
Bock v. City of Columbia, 274 S.W.3d 555, 560 (Mo. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
Employee described what he cannot see and his testimony is credible. It does not matter why employee cannot see. Although I am a layperson, I have personal experience with vision. I can comprehend and understand the extent of employee's vision loss by his descriptions of the things he cannot see and those few visual characteristics he can distinguish. Based upon employee's description of the few things he can distinguish, I have no difficulty finding that he has a complete loss of vision in his left eye.
Employee credibly testified that he has had the left eye condition since childhood and that it has never improved, even after surgery. Employee has established that his left eye condition is permanent.
The Second Injury Fund suggests that employee has not shown that his left eye condition was a hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment. This suggestion is ridiculous. The Second Injury Fund is well-aware that the determination of whether a preexisting disability is a hindrance or obstacle to employment takes into consideration far more than the extent to which the disability has caused vocational problems in the past.
When determining SIF liability, the proper focus of the inquiry is "not on the extent to which the condition has caused difficulty in the past; it is on the potential that the condition may combine with a work-related injury in the future so as to cause a greater degree of disability than would have resulted in the absence of the condition." (emphasis in original). Wuebbeling v. West County Drywall, 898 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Mo.App.E.D. 1995).
Knisley v. Charleswood Corp., 211 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Mo. App. 2007).
Enployee: Robert E. Gentry
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Considering the most obvious potential combination, if employee were to lose the vision in his right eye in a work-related accident, he would be completely blind. Certainly, being completely blind is a greater disability than being blind in the right eye. Employee's left eye condition was a hindrance or obstacle to employment on March 29, 2007.
According to § 287.190.1(29) RSMo, employee's complete loss of vision in his left eye means he suffers a preexisting permanent disability equal to 140 weeks. Employee has shown that his vision condition meets the threshold set forth in § 287.220.1 RSMo.
The administrative law judge believes that employee's right arm disability combines with the disability caused by his left eye condition to result in an overall disability that is 20% greater than the simple sum of the disabilities. I would affirm the administrative law judge's award.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the award of the Commission majority.
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member