Having given careful consideration to the entire record, based upon the above testimony, the competent and substantial evidence presented and the applicable law, I find the following:
A claimant in a worker's compensation proceeding has the burden of proving all elements of his claim to a reasonable probability. Cardwell v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Mo.App. 2008). In order for a claimant to recover against the Second Injury Fund for PTD or PPD, he must prove that a pre-existing disability combined with a disability from a subsequent injury in one of two ways: (1) the two disabilities combined result in a greater overall disability than that which would have resulted from the new injury alone and of itself; or (2) the pre-existing disability combined with the disability from the subsequent injury to create permanent total disability. Reese v. Gary \& Roger Link, Inc., 5 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Mo.App. 1999), citing Searcy v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., 894 S.W.2d 173, 177-178 (Mo.App. 1995); Uhlir v. Farmer, 94 S.W.3d 441, 444 (Mo.App. 2003).
Claimant must also prove that he had a pre-existing permanent partial disability, whether from a compensable injury or otherwise, that: (1) existed at the time the last injury was sustained; (2) was of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to his employment or reemployment should he become unemployed; and (3) equals a minimum of 50 weeks of compensation for injuries to the body as a whole or 15 % for major extremities. Dunn v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 272 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo.App. 2008)(Citations omitted).
The first inquiry to be made is whether the employer is liable for permanent total disability. Under Section 287.220.1 RSMo., the Second Injury Fund has no liability and the employer is responsible for full, permanent total disability benefits if the last injury "considered alone and of itself" results in permanent total disability. Roller v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 935 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. App. 1996) and Maas v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 964 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1998).
The test for permanent total disability is whether, given the employee's situation and condition, he or she is competent to compete in the open labor market. Reiner v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo. App. 1992). Total disability means the "inability to return to any reasonable or normal employment." Brown v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. App. 1990).
Determining that Claimant is permanently and totally disabled is only part of the analysis; it is also necessary to determine which party, if any, is liable for the corresponding benefits. In any case involving the Second Injury Fund, the first determination is the degree of disability from the last injury. If a claimant's last injury in and of itself rendered the claimant permanently and totally disabled, then the Second Injury Fund has no liability and the employer is responsible for the entire amount. Hughey v. Chrysler Corp., 34 S.W.3d 845, 847 Mo.App. 2000)(citations omitted). When the situation is reversed, and the final disability is exclusively the result of the preexisting condition, it is equally true that the Second Injury Fund is not liable, since there is no tie-in with a compensable injury. 5 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW Ch. 10,§59,32(g)(1992). However, when the evidence supports a
finding that it is a combination of previous disabilities with the last injury that results in permanent and total disability, the Second Injury Fund is liable. See Boring v. Treasurer of Mo., Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 947 S.W.2d 483, 489-490 (Mo.App. 1997)(overruled on other grounds in Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo banc 2003).
Claimant's case in the matter at hand regarding a claim for permanent disability is based largely on two particular findings by the experts. One, the finding that he suffers psychiatric disability and two, that he lacks the ability to speak English fluently and is incapable of progressing in the study of English. I find that the argument and expert conclusions for each of these alleged conditions and circumstances are overstated and exaggerated.
The Administrative Law Judge as the trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses in workers' compensation cases. Bock v. Broadway Ford Truck Sales, 55 S.W.3d 427,437 (Mo.App.E.D.2001). The ALJ is free to disbelieve the testimony of any witness, even if there is no contrary or impeaching evidence. ABB Power T\&B Company v. Kempker, 236 S.W.3d 43,51-52 (Mo.App.W.D.2007). Thus, the ALJ is free to accept or reject any evidence, including medical evidence. ABB Power, 236 S.W.3d at 52. It is within the ALJ's discretion to determine the weight to be given to expert opinions, including those on causation. Putnam-Heisler v. Columbia Foods, 989 S.W.2d 257,261 (Mo.App.W.D.1999).
Although Claimant has been treated for other injuries and illnesses both in Europe and since arriving in America, Claimant was not diagnosed with a psychiatric condition until November, 2005. Evidence supporting the cause, nature and extent of the alleged PTSD and depressive disorder is not persuasive even if competent.
Claimant was treated by Dr. Rao and evaluated by Dr. Stillings with regard to PTSD and depression. I do not find persuasive the conclusions regarding causation for the condition. The allegation is that the illness arose from Claimant's time in Bosnia during the war. He was also being treated for cancer prior to coming to America. The causative connection between the origin and the diagnosis are too tenuous to be established as factual. Even though mental illness could go untreated for years, Claimant has been to many doctors both here and in Europe without a diagnosis prior to November 2005. I find this significant.
Dr. Rao prescribed medication for Claimant which Claimant found ineffective and stopped taking. He is not under a doctor's care for depression or PTSD. Other experts then relied on the diagnosis when drawing their ultimate conclusions of permanent total or permanent partial disability. Given all Claimant has experienced and been through there is no question he could suffer from a psychiatric condition and specifically the conditions diagnosed by Drs. Rao and Stillings. The nature and extent however of that diagnosis in this matter may make the difference of finding PTD or no PTD. I do not find the medical evidence is sufficient to show by competent and substantial evidence that Claimant has greater than 10 % PPD from his depression or PTSD.
Second, the expert conclusions regarding Claimant's lack of competence in the English language and the affect his psychiatric condition has on his ability to progress in the fluency of that language are rejected by Claimant's demonstrated linguistic abilities. A thick accent is not
evidence of capacity or competence. Claimant not only spoke two languages when he arrived in the United States, he had already demonstrated an ability and desire to learn one foreign tongue (German) while in country only a short period. Even if his learning of German was only out of necessity while he was there, he nevertheless began the process of learning that language before leaving for America.
After arriving in the United States, Claimant progressed in English to the point of reading or attempting to read printed material in English. Furthermore he has demonstrated the ability to work several jobs where English was spoken, meet with doctors, submitted to depositions, and testified in a legal procedure under oath all without the aid or assistance of an interpreter. While Claimant has a strong accent, he is still understandable and clearly comprehends what is being spoken. Evidence and arguments by Claimant made to the contrary are not credible and given no weight.