Claimant has the burden to prove her right to compensation under the Missouri Workers' Compensation statute. Duncan v. Springfield R-12 School District, 897 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995). This includes the burden of proving all essential elements of her claim. Decker v. Square D. Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); Bruflat v. Mr. Guy, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). It is not enough for Claimant to demonstrate that she fell at work and thereafter developed some physical difficulties. Claimant's burden includes proving that her injury arose out of and the course of her employment. An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and
(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and
(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal unemployment life;
§ 287.020.3(2) RSMo 1994.
Moreover, medical causation not within the common knowledge or experience must be demonstrated by scientific or medical evidence showing a relationship between the asserted cause and the alleged condition. Lingo v. Midwest Block and Brick, Inc. 307 S.W.3d 233 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). Even considering that the above statute in effect at the time of Claimant's accident employs a lesser standard than that adopted by the Missouri General Assembly in 2005, and that the Workers' Compensation Law in 1998 was to be construed liberally, § 287.800 RSMo 1994, I conclude that Claimant's alleged seizure disorder is not compensable. I do, however, conclude that Employer has
Issued by the Division of Workers' Compensation
Employee: Patricia Payne
Injury No. 98-172549
liability for permanent partial disability for injuries to the neck and shoulder. I further conclude that the Second Injury Fund has liability for enhanced permanent partial disability.
In this case, there is medical testimony in Claimant's favor, but the Administrative Law Judge may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's experts. George v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo. App. E.D.1993). Here, the overwhelming medical evidence in the record indicates that Claimant does not even suffer seizures, but instead, suffers psychological problems. If she does suffer seizures, the credible evidence in the record is insufficient to demonstrate the causal connection between the fall and the condition.
There is no objective evidence of any seizures. Neither routine EEG nor the extensive testing performed over several days at Barnes-Jewish in St. Louis has revealed any objective evidence of seizures. The only evidence that Claimant suffers from seizures is the subjective reports from Claimant and her relatives. But there has been no medical verification of any seizure at any time since they purportedly began three years after the work accident. Even Dr. Burger, who currently treats Claimant for her alleged seizure disorder, admitted that he has not confirmed the presence of seizures through any diagnostic testing.
Medical records confirm that Drs. Slater, Mauldin and Yerra all independently suspected that Claimant suffered anxiety-related or psychological problems that would explain her condition. Neuropsychologist Philip Mothershead did not disagree.
The subjective complaints of Claimant and her relatives are suspect. For instance, when Claimant went to the emergency room on New Years' Eve in 2001 and later in January 2002, nothing in those medical records suggests that Claimant was suffering from seizures despite Claimant's contention to the contrary.
Issued by the Division of Workers' Compensation
Employee: Patricia Payne
Injury No. 98-172549
The professionals at the St. John's facility in Springfield who hospitalized Claimant in March 2002, did so only upon her insistence. These are independent medical providers not affiliated with Employer. It was Claimant's own personal physician, Dr. Yerra, who was the attending physician. An EEG authorized by Dr. Yerra was normal. Dr. Yerra found no physical abnormalities, and noted that emotional upset would trigger the symptoms that Claimant complained about.
Claimant might point to the MRI scan of the brain on March 7, 2000, as medical-causal evidence that her alleged seizure condition exists and is related to the work accident. But the experts have almost uniformly noted that the spot on the MRI could be from a stroke or infection, or even idiopathic. As Dr. Hackett explained, there is no way to know the cause without a brain biopsy. While Dr. Bennoch and Dr. Burger causally connect the MRI finding to seizures, the fact remains that the seizures themselves have never been confirmed through traditional or video EEG testing.
Merely because an accident causes injury to one part of Claimant's body does not mean the same accident causes injuries to other parts of the body. See e.g., Selby v. Transworld Airlines, 831 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992) overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003) (denying compensation for brain damage that Claimant believed was related to a fall at work during which she hit her head), and Royal v. Advantica Rstaurant Group, Inc., 194 S.W.3d 371 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (finding that somatoform disorder was not caused by slip and fall at work). I am not persuaded by Claimant's evidence. I conclude that the alleged seizure disorder is not medically and causally related to her 1998 fall at Earthgrains. The alleged seizure disorder did not arise out of and within the course of Claimant's employment.