As a matter of law, I concur with the majority's decision to the extent that it allows the Second Injury Fund (SIF) a credit of 212.8 weeks for permanent partial disability (PPD) attributable to the employee's primary injury against its PTD award.
However, based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding permanent total disability (PTD) against the Second Injury Fund (SIF) should be reversed.
As stated in the SIF's application for review and persuasively argued in its brief, the ALJ erred in awarding employee PTD under § 287.220.3 based on Dr. David Volarich's expert opinion.
Dr. Volarich's opinions regarding the effects of the employee's preexisting conditions and the cause of her PTD are inconsistent. It is unclear what Dr. Volarich's genuine opinion is, as he agreed to multiple variations in his views. Therefore, his statements cannot be considered credible evidence as to the nature and extent of the employee's disabilities or the cause of her total disability.
As part of Dr. Volarich's initial, 2018 evaluation Dr. Volarich opined that the employee was PTD due to the primary injury in combination with her preexisting medical conditions. Dr. Volarich diagnosed four separate preexisting conditions. His discussion of synergistic effects discussed all four of these conditions and their impact on the employee. While discussing these synergistic effects, Dr. Volarich gave no opinions about and used no language concerning the requirements of $\S 287.220 .3$. He further referenced an L4-5 fusion employee had in May of 2016, over a year after her primary injury, as relevant to the employee's PTD.
Dr. Volarich's August 2020 addendum attempted to address § 287.220.3 but failed to state that the employee's lumbar spine directly and significantly aggravated or accelerated the employee's primary injury, as required by the statute. The addendum includes no mention of the employee's prior cervical spine or right foot conditions. Though the addendum concludes by opining that the employee was PTD due to a combination of her primary injury and lumbar syndrome, Dr. Volarich admitted in his deposition testimony that this was incorrect.
Dr. Volarich's third addendum attempts to address only two of the employee's preexisting conditions, pancreatitis and lower back. It includes no specific analysis and fails to amend his prior PTD opinions, which stated that the employee was PTD due to a combination of her primary injury and all of her preexisting conditions. Dr. Volarich went on in his deposition to change his PTD opinion, stating that he felt the employee was PTD due to a combination of her primary injury and her preexisting pancreatitis and low back condition, emphasizing a synergistic effect.
Dr. Volarich's opinions morphed over time with each request from the employee's counsel, not because of new evidence or records, but because he was asked to fit the
Employee's preexisting conditions into the categorical requirements of $\S 287.220 .3$. While he attempts to give opinions to support these requirements, his opinions are vague generalizations. He speaks in general terms and does not explain how either of the employee's preexisting conditions actually directly and significantly aggravated or accelerated her primary neck and left shoulder injuries. His opinions are thus not credible, are insufficient to meet the categorical requirements of that statute, and cannot be considered sufficient evidence upon which to base an award of PTD against the SIF. Section 287.220 .3 was added to the law to provide stricter requirements for SIF liability. Even under $\S 287.220 .3$, there must be more than a blanket statement to find SIF liability. See Winingear v. Treasurer of State, 474 S.W.3d 203 (Mo. App. 2015).
As Dr. Volarich's opinions are not credible, the ALJ's award is not supported by competent evidence. Even assuming arguendo that Dr. Volarich's opinions are to be believed, his opinions are still insufficient to support a finding of SIF liability. The ALJ's determination and interpretation of $\S 287.220 .3(2)$ (a)a(iii) based on Dr. Volarich's opinions renders the language "directly and significantly" in the statute meaningless and redundant. It is contrary to the legislative intent of the 2014 amendments to the law and the strict construction mandate of $\S 287.800$. Such an interpretation affronts the objectives of statutory construction and should not be accepted.
Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

Reid K. Forrester, Member