STATE OF MISSOURI Missouri Cases

James McGregory appealed his convictions for domestic assault and property damage, raising two unpreserved claims of error concerning the admission of prior threats and the amount of the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund (CVC) judgment. The appellate court declined plain error review for the evidence admissibility claim, finding no manifest injustice. However, it granted plain error review for the CVC judgment, concluding the trial court erred by imposing a $46 judgment for a Class E felony, which was not authorized by the applicable statute at the time of the offense. The court modified the CVC judgment to $10 and affirmed the judgment as modified.

Russell Kenneth Clancy appealed his conviction for second-degree assault against a special victim, arguing there was insufficient evidence to prove he acted recklessly when he punched a law enforcement officer. The incident occurred during an altercation where Clancy, who was intoxicated, became belligerent and resisted arrest. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that the trial testimony and body camera footage provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude Clancy acted recklessly.

James Willis Peters appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated, arguing the state failed to prove one of his prior offenses was an intoxication-related traffic offense (IRTO) for chronic offender enhancement. The circuit court had sentenced Peters as a chronic offender based on four prior IRTOs, including a 2002 municipal offense. The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for resentencing, holding that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 2002 offense involved physically driving or operating a vehicle, as required by the current definition of "driving" for IRTOs.

Elizabeth M. Speer appealed her convictions for second-degree property damage and fourth-degree assault, arguing the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing and did not obtain a written waiver of counsel. The State conceded error on both points. The appellate court reversed Speer's convictions and sentences, remanding the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court failed to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment and Section 600.051.

Deandre Walton appealed his convictions for murder, armed criminal action, and unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police. Walton contended his Miranda waiver was involuntary due to police deception about the true nature of the investigation. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Walton's waiver was voluntary because he was informed of his rights, understood them, and continued speaking with detectives, consistent with prior case law.

Gerald Nytes appealed his conviction after a bench trial for violating a full order of protection. He argued the State's evidence was insufficient to prove he had legal or actual notice of the order. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that evidence of Nytes's presence at the order of protection hearing and his prior guilty pleas for violating the same order were sufficient to establish actual notice.

Appellant Derrie Williams appealed the motion court's denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Williams argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to allow him to testify and for failing to investigate and call two witnesses. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding that its findings of fact and conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous regarding both claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Daniel Williams appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental state. Williams contended that such an investigation could have revealed mental health issues relevant to a diminished capacity defense. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding that Williams failed to demonstrate how additional information about his mental state would have aided his defense or satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

James Eggleston appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, arguing insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly possessed methamphetamine found in a vehicle he was driving. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, clarifying that the plain language of the relevant statutes does not require "additional incriminating evidence" to establish possession in shared spaces, thereby rejecting prior case law. The Court found sufficient evidence that Eggleston was in actual possession of the methamphetamine and acted knowingly, supported by circumstantial evidence.

Amanda Rogers appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The Court held that the state presented sufficient evidence of Rogers' knowing possession of the firearm, rejecting the requirement for 'additional incriminating evidence' in joint possession cases. It also found that law enforcement had probable cause for the vehicle search based on an informant's tip and other circumstances.

Carl Cameron Ferguson appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call a specific witness. The motion court denied relief, finding Ferguson's pro se motion facially deficient and, alternatively, that the decision not to call the witness was reasonable trial strategy. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, agreeing that the pro se motion was deficient and that the trial counsel's decision was a matter of reasonable trial strategy.

David K. Duncan, Sr. was convicted of three counts of first-degree statutory rape and six counts of second-degree child molestation of his granddaughter. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding that the trial court properly admitted evidence of Duncan's statement to the victim that he had sex with his wife at the same age as the victim, ruling this was logically and legally relevant and not improper propensity evidence.

Craig M. Wood appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief from his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence for the abduction and murder of Hailey Owens. Wood raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding its findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous and that Wood failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance or prejudice.

Harry Little appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief from convictions for murder, armed criminal action, and unlawful possession of a firearm. He claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call an alibi witness and failing to argue a specific alternate perpetrator. The motion court denied relief, finding counsel's decisions were reasonable trial strategy. The appellate court affirmed, agreeing that the alibi witness's testimony was not viable and that presenting a general alternate perpetrator theory was a reasonable strategic choice.

The court affirmed the defendant's conviction on two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant applied physical force that overcame the victim's reasonable resistance, constituting forcible compulsion. The defendant's arguments that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove forcible compulsion were rejected.

Jeffrey Lematty appealed his convictions for first-degree rape and second-degree burglary, alleging instructional errors, improper admission and exclusion of evidence, and insufficient evidence for burglary. The appellate court reversed Lematty's second-degree burglary conviction, finding plain error in the verdict directing instruction that misstated the law by potentially excusing the State from proving the unlawful entry element. The court affirmed the first-degree rape conviction and all other challenged aspects of the trial court's judgment.

Dustin Robinson appealed his conviction for felony resisting arrest, arguing that resisting arrest on an outstanding felony warrant should be classified as a misdemeanor, not a felony, under section 575.150.5(1) RSMo. Robinson contended that only warrantless arrests for a felony, or arrests on warrants for failure to appear or probation violations in felony cases, could support a felony resisting arrest charge. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that an arrest made pursuant to a warrant for a felony offense is still considered an arrest "for a felony" under the statute, regardless of whether the arrest was made with or without a warrant.

Jayelyn Rivers appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and resisting arrest, arguing that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the unlawful possession conviction. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to infer Rivers had actual, knowing possession of the firearm. This evidence included the gun's location under his seat, his superior access, its visibility, and his flight from law enforcement.

Richard Neil Burkett was convicted of first-degree assault after a jury trial. On appeal, Burkett contended the circuit court erred by not submitting a self-defense instruction and by not giving a curative instruction regarding the State's closing argument. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, declining to review Burkett's unpreserved claims for plain error because he caused or contributed to the alleged errors and his claims were ill-suited for plain error review.

Isis S. Jones was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon after a jury trial. On appeal, Jones argued the circuit court plainly erred by accepting a jury verdict based on an instruction that varied from the charged offense, leading to an improper sentence. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, declining plain error review because Jones failed to establish that the alleged error was "facially evident, obvious, and clear," as shooting "into" a vehicle necessarily subsumes shooting "at" it.

Israel Barrera moved to suppress urine test results obtained via two warrants in a sexual molestation case. The circuit court sustained the motion, finding a lack of probable cause for Warrant 1 and that the good-faith exception did not apply. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the suppression order, holding that the affidavit for Warrant 1 provided a substantial basis for probable cause, particularly due to corroborative details of the victim's medical examination. The Court affirmed that Warrant 1 authorized both seizure and search, rendering Warrant 2 unnecessary, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Demetrius L. Davis appealed the motion court's denial of his amended Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. The State argued the motion court erred in reviewing Davis's untimely amended motion after finding he was abandoned by unappointed post-conviction counsel. The appellate court agreed, holding that the abandonment doctrine applies only to appointed counsel, not counsel who voluntarily entered an appearance. Therefore, the motion court lacked authority to review the untimely amended motion and should have only reviewed the timely filed pro se motion. The appeal was dismissed for lack of a final judgment, and the case was remanded for adjudication of the pro se claims.

Emonne Dillon appealed his convictions for second-degree murder, unlawful use of a weapon, and armed criminal action, stemming from a fatal shooting that occurred during a brawl. Dillon argued the trial court erred by refusing his non-MAI instructions on imperfect self-defense, denying his motion to strike a juror for cause, and admitting hearsay testimony. The appellate court affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's decisions regarding jury instructions, juror selection, or the admission of the challenged statement.

Billy Wagner appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. The motion court had applied the incorrect version of Rule 29.15(g) to determine the deadline for filing an amended motion and failed to adjudicate all claims in Wagner's pro se motion. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable judgment, holding that the version of Rule 29.15 in effect at sentencing governs and that the abandonment doctrine does not apply to retained counsel.

Shawn Ray Hollingshead appealed his jury convictions for statutory sodomy and child molestation, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by allowing an undisclosed rebuttal witness to counter his alibi defense. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that Hollingshead failed to provide proper notice of his intent to rely on an alibi defense, which relieved the State of its duty to disclose the rebuttal witness. Furthermore, the court found that his wife's testimony did not constitute a true alibi because it did not account for his whereabouts for the entire charging period.

Preston Gremminger was convicted by a jury of two counts of statutory sodomy, one count of statutory rape, and two counts of incest, receiving a 128-year prison sentence. On appeal, Gremminger claimed the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of a victim's prior sexual abuse allegation, improperly admitting propensity evidence, and rejecting lesser-included offense instructions. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding no error in its rulings on these issues.

Barry E. Anderson appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court had found abandonment by counsel and reviewed his untimely amended motion. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that the amended motion was untimely because the abandonment doctrine does not apply to unappointed counsel, and the motion court's post hoc appointment was invalid. However, the court affirmed the judgment because all claims in Anderson's timely pro se motion had been properly adjudicated.

Eric A. Pritchett appealed his convictions for stealing and two counts of burglary, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for the value of stolen goods, the admission of screenshots under the best evidence rule, and the enhancement of his sentence as a persistent offender. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. It found sufficient evidence to prove the value of the stolen laptops exceeded $25,000, and determined the best evidence rule was not violated because witnesses testified only about admitted screenshots, not the original unavailable video. The court also declined plain error review for the sentence enhancement, noting Pritchett was on notice of the State's intent.

Oscar Ward was convicted of kidnapping and domestic assault. On appeal, Ward argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting a computer-enhanced 911 call that was disclosed to the defense only one week before trial. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the late disclosure did not result in fundamental unfairness or prejudice to Ward, especially since he did not request a continuance and the evidence was cumulative of other testimony.

Jonathan Rainey appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the sufficiency of evidence for the firearm charge. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. It held that the protective search of Rainey's person and vehicle was justified by reasonable suspicion, and the subsequent search was supported by probable cause, thus the evidence was admissible. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm.

David Love appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for making gang references during voir dire, failing to include a limiting instruction for prior bad acts in jury instructions, and failing to quash the jury panel due to a fair cross-section violation. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding that while his amended motion was untimely and counsel abandoned him, remand was unnecessary, and Love failed to prove his ineffective assistance claims.

Patrick Logan Pulse appealed his convictions for first-degree assault and armed criminal action, stemming from shooting a Lyft driver, arguing self-defense at trial. On appeal, Pulse challenged the admission of three pieces of evidence: a video of his arrest, a video of him in a police car post-arrest, and his hospital records showing controlled substances. He also claimed instructional error for the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of others. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the judgment, finding no merit to Pulse's claims of error regarding evidence admission or instructional error.

Danielle Lechocki appealed her conviction for attempted unlawful use of a weapon, arguing the trial court erred by refusing a self-defense jury instruction. She contended there was substantial evidence to support such an instruction, including conflicting testimony about who initiated the confrontation and her reasonable fear of imminent unlawful force given her physical condition. The appellate court agreed, reversing the conviction and remanding the case for retrial, holding that the evidence required a self-defense instruction and that factual issues regarding the degree of force and its justification were for the jury.

The State of Missouri brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the circuit court's order sustaining Amanda Mire's motion to suppress certain statements and evidence in a driving while intoxicated case. The circuit court initially made a docket entry on February 26, 2024, suppressing the evidence, and later entered a more formal "judgment and order" on March 11, 2024. The State filed its notice of appeal on March 11, 2024. The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the February 26 docket entry was the operative order, and the State failed to file its notice of appeal within the statutory five-day period from that date.

Ashontai Wallace appealed his convictions for first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree kidnapping, and three counts of armed criminal action, arguing the evidence was insufficient. The appellate court affirmed all convictions. It found sufficient independent evidence to establish the corpus delicti for robbery and that the victims were confined for a "substantial period" for the kidnapping charges, rejecting Wallace's "merely incidental" argument based on a recent Supreme Court ruling.

Mary Barton appealed her conviction for false impersonation, arguing there was insufficient evidence that the victim relied on her pretended official authority. The trial court had found Barton guilty after a bench trial, sentencing her to 180 days in jail. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the victim's actions, both during and after the phone call, demonstrated reliance on Barton's representation as a law enforcement investigator.

Ralph Alexander appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction relief motion, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Alexander claimed counsel failed to investigate an alibi witness, failed to file a motion in limine to exclude prior bad acts evidence, and improperly elicited hearsay testimony. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding its conclusions were not clearly erroneous and that Alexander failed to demonstrate prejudice or that counsel's actions fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Timothy Perkins appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the victim about alleged habits of stealing and lying in his statutory sodomy trial. The motion court denied relief, finding counsel's decision was reasonable trial strategy. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that counsel's choice not to pursue that specific line of questioning was a reasonable strategic decision, especially given the trial court's prior rulings and counsel's alternative methods of challenging credibility.

Cody Boehmer pleaded guilty to property damage and trespass, and the circuit court sentenced him. Later, the court entered a separate order requiring Boehmer to pay restitution. Boehmer appealed, arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the restitution order after sentencing. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals agreed, vacating the restitution order because the circuit court had exhausted its jurisdiction upon imposing the original sentence.

Howard Kristopher Moots appealed his convictions for statutory sodomy and child molestation, arguing the circuit court's written judgment incorrectly stated his sentence as "999 years" when the oral pronouncement was "life in prison." The State conceded the error. The appellate court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter a corrected written judgment reflecting the oral pronouncement of life in prison for the statutory sodomy counts, affirming the judgment in all other respects.

Mose Martin appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 amended motion for post-conviction relief, following his conviction for first-degree assault. Martin claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a lay witness to impeach the victim's credibility and for failing to call an expert witness to testify about memory impairment caused by crack cocaine use. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding that trial counsel's actions were reasonable and that Martin failed to demonstrate prejudice.

Orlando Moore appealed his convictions for second-degree domestic assault and first-degree property damage following a bench trial. Moore challenged the admission of the victim's statements to police under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing hearsay exception and raised a Sixth Amendment confrontation-clause claim. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting the victim's statements because Moore's manipulative actions caused her unavailability, and declined plain error review of the unpreserved confrontation-clause claim.

Kevin P. Coplin was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of child molestation first degree. On appeal, Coplin argued the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his request for a mistrial after the State asked a question on re-direct examination that he claimed improperly implied a prior bad act. The Eastern District affirmed the conviction, holding that the defense had "opened the door" to the line of questioning, the question was unanswered, and any potential prejudice was negated by jury instructions and the jury's mixed verdict.

Janaya Neither appealed her conviction for assault in the second degree and armed criminal action, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by admitting social media posts without an adequate foundation, which she claimed resulted in prejudice. The State charged Appellant with assault and armed criminal action for slashing T.G. with a knife, while Appellant claimed self-defense. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the social media posts, as there was sufficient evidence of their authenticity. Furthermore, the court concluded that even if there was an error in admission, Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice warranting reversal.

Shyheim El-Mumin appealed his convictions for assault, armed criminal action, unlawful use of a weapon, and property damage, challenging the admission of firearm examiner testimony and the trial court's persistent offender finding. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. It found the challenge to the firearm examiner's testimony unpreserved and waived, and held that the defendant's admission to prior felonies committed at different times obviated the need for a jury finding on persistent offender status, even under Erlinger v. United States.

Andrew J. Sales, Jr., a prior and persistent felony drug offender, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, possession, tampering with evidence, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, following a jury trial where he represented himself. Sales challenged the probable cause for a search warrant, the sufficiency of the evidence regarding chain of custody and drug paraphernalia, and claimed he was denied his right to counsel. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding no merit in any of his claims, including that his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and that the evidence was sufficient.

Christopher Russell appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call an alibi witness and for not objecting to prejudicial body camera audio. The motion court denied his claims after an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding no error in its conclusions regarding trial counsel's reasonable strategy and lack of prejudice.

Ledra Craig appealed his convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and armed criminal action, following a jury trial. Craig argued the trial court erred by not removing a juror who recognized a witness and potentially saw him in shackles, and by not sua sponte intervening during the prosecutor's closing argument. The Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in retaining the juror and no plain error in the prosecutor's remarks.

Christina N. Knapp appealed the denial of her Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming her plea counsel coerced her into pleading guilty, rendering her plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. The motion court denied relief, finding plea counsel's testimony credible and that Knapp's plea was voluntary. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the motion court did not clearly err because the plea hearing record and counsel's testimony refuted Knapp's claims of coercion and ineffective assistance of counsel.